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We in the United States are philosophically committed to the political prin-
ciple that governmental policymaking-by which I mean simply decisions
as to which values among competing values shall prevail, and as to how those
values shall be implemented'-ought to be subject to control by persons
accountable to the electorate.2 As a general matter, a person is accountable to
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This Article is part of a larger work-in-progress, which will be published as a book by the Yale University Press
in 1982, and which is tentatively titled THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY. Another part will be
published in another symposium on judicial review. See Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases:
A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. - (1981).
I. Cf. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1978):
By a -legislature," I mean a body whose chief function in government is to formulate general rules
of law that primarily reflect the notions of utility and value held by its members. Such a body is to be
distinguished from a trial court, which applies law received from legally superior sources; from an
administrative agency, which, in its rule-making capacity, formulates policy only within the limits of its
organic statute; and from a "traditional" appellate court, which, in formulating law, is guided primarily
by precedent. By "policy," I mean the specific social purposes that a legislative body seeks to fulfill
through its enactments. These definitions are not watertight ....
2. "Democracy" is a freighted term. Some constitutional theorists have tried to resolve the tension be-
tween constitutional policymaking by the Supreme Court and our societal commitment to democratic govern-
ment more at the level of definition than of theory. They define democracy in terms of certain substantive ideals
and then contend that because (or to the extent that) the Court's constitutional policymaking serves to effectuate
those ideals, it is democratic. But that strategem cannot work unless the audience to which it is addressed
accepts, or can be persuaded to accept, the controversial claim that the concept of democracy entails the
particular substantive ideals stipulated by the theorist and the further claim, also controversial, that the particu-
lar exercise(s) of constitutional policymaking in question serves to effectuate one or more of those ideals.
Moreover, the definitional argument simply overlooks the fact that, whatever the character of particular deci-
sions rendered by the Court in the course of constitutional policymaking, the Court itself is plainly not an
electorally accountable institution; that fact is precisely what gives rise to the debate about the legitimacy of the
Court's constitutional policymaking in the first place. Consequently, the definitional argument is destined to
exert, and in fact has exerted, very little influence in current constitutional debate. Fora recent example ofthe
definitional strategem, see Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
The notion of democracy on which I rely is primarily procedural, not substantive. With Brian Barry,
I follow ... those who insist that "democracy" is to be understood in procedural terms. That is to
say, I reject the notion that one should build into "'democracy" any constraints on the content of the
outcomes produced, such as substantive equality, respect for human rights, concern for the general
welfare, personal liberty or the rule of law.
Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (FIFTH SERIES) 155, 156 (P. Laslett
& J. Fishkin eds. 1979). But see H. THOMAS, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD 388 (1979): "Winston Churchill is
believed to have said, 'Democracy means that if the door bell rings in the early hours, it is likely to be the
milkman."' Barry adds: "The only exceptions ... are those required by democracy itself as a procedure."
Barry, supra, at 156. Barry, therefore, probably would not deny, and in any event I readily concede, that the
concept of democracy entails the principle of freedom of expression; after all, for government to manipulate the
flow of information is for it to manipulate, to some extent, the choices people make in casting their ballots. But
that concession has very limited consequences, as we'll see.
The following rough definition captures the procedural notion of democracy I have in mind:
A democracy is rule by the people where "the people" includes all adult citizens not excluded by some
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the electorate directly if he holds elective office for a designated, temporary
period and can remain in office beyond that period only by winning reelection;
accountability is indirect if he holds appointive office and can remain in office
only at the discretion of his appointer (who in turn is electorally accountable) 3
or, if his office is for a designated, temporary period, by securing reappoint-
ment after that period has expired. (I do not for a moment suppose that
electorally accountable policymaking invariably generates policies supported
by a majority of the electorate. Frequently it is difficult to know whether a
particular policy choice enjoys such support, and not infrequently safe to say
that it does not.4) If judicial review does not run counter to the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking, it is at least in serious tension with it.
5
In constitutional cases, the Supreme Court, which designedly is not account-
6
able to the electorate, stands ready to strike down policy choices made by
electorally accountable persons-officials of the legislative or executive
branches of government, whether federal or state. The problem thus arises
whether, given the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, judicial
review is legitimate. In our political culture, the principle of electorally ac-
generally agreed upon and reasonable disqualifying factor, such as confinement to prison or to an
asylum for the mentally ill, or some procedural requirement, such as residency within a particular
electoral district for a reasonable length of time before the election in question. "Rule" means that
public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely
elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which each voter who chooses to vote
counts equally ... and in which a plurality is determinative.
J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 7 (1979). For a similar definition, see H. MAYO, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 70 (1960). See also J. PENNOCK, supra, at 14:
As has been shown, it is at least arguable that the same substantive concept of democracy will fit both
West and East. A formal or procedural definition of democracy that would fit our Western-style
democracy, however, clearly would rule out Communist regimes and so-called peoples' democracies.
Because the word "democracy" is so freighted and misused, suggestive of vague substantive ideals as well as
procedural forms, I use it only sparingly. In its stead I use a different term: "electorally accountable policy-
making."
It is not uncommon forjudges who are not electorally accountable to engage in policymaking by fashioning
"common law" or by "interpreting" vague statutory provisions. But judges engage in such policymaking as
delegates of the legislature, and whatever policy choices they make are subject to revision by the legislature.
Thus, nonconstitutional policymaking by the judiciary is consistent with the principle in the text.
3. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 29 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as CHOPER].
4. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 106, 108, 131, 132, 133 (1956). See also Bishin,
Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (1977). In his recent book, Jesse Choper
stresses the fact that policymaking by Congress-the electoral accountability of whose members is, of course.
direct-does not "result in the automatic translation of the majority will into detailed legislation." CHOPER,
supra note 3, at 12. See also id. at 12-25. But that state of affairs is somewhat beside the point, since the political
principle to which we are philosophically committed demands only that policymaking be electorally account-
able, not that it necessarily generate policies supported by a majority of the electorate-although, to be sure, one
important reason we value electorally accountable policymaking is that we think it more sensitive to the
sentiments of majorities than is policymaking that is not electorally accountable.
5. Whether and to what extent judicial review-or at least some judicial review-runs counter to that
principle is the subject of the work of which this Article is a part.
6. Nor are the lower federal courts electorally accountable. Under article III, § I of the Constitution, "[the
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office." See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 464, 465-66 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961).
That the Supreme Court is not accountable to the electorate does not mean that the Court is altogether immune
to political influence or even exempt from political control.
1981] INTERPRETIVISM
countable policymaking is axiomatic; 7 it is judicial review, not that principle,
that requires justification. 8
Of course, one could begin the effort to justify judicial review by rejecting
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking. (Every year I have
several students who refuse to take the principle seriously.9) The justificatory
enterprise is certainly much simpler if one begins that way. However, any
constitutional theory predicated on a rejection of the principle of electorally
acountable policymaking is destined to have little currency, since, so far as I
can tell, the vast majority of the audience to whom theories of judicial review
are directed regard the principle as axiomatic. Therefore, my strategy is not to
reject the principle but, on the contrary, to accept it as a given and then to
defend judicial review-in particular, constitutional policymaking-as not in-
consistent with the principle.'o
Let's begin with a fundamental distinction. There are two basic sorts of
judicial review. Following Tom Grey and John Ely, I will refer to them,
respectively, as interpretive review and noninterpretive review." The legiti-
macy of noninterpretive review is the central problem of contemporary con-
stitutional theory. The distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive
review can best be elaborated in terms of a particular conception of the
United States Constitution. The Constitution consists of a complex of value
7. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5, 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY]:
We have as a society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a
representative democracy must be our form of government.
Moral absolutists and moral relativists alike have embraced and defended democracy on their own
terms-the former on the ground that it is a tenet of natural law, the latter as the most natural
institutional reaction to the realization that there is no moral certainty.
[W]hatever the explanation, and granting the qualification, rule in accord with the consent of a majority
of those governed is the core of the American governmental system.
Cf. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15 (1956) (quoted in text accompanying note 69 infra).
8. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1%2):
[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice
to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institu-
tions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review
works counter to this characteristic.
9. Morton Horwitz seems not to take the principle seriously, but then Horwitz is not trying to justify
judicial review. See Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979). See also Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981).
10. If I were unable to defend constitutional policymaking by the judiciary as consistent with the principle
of electorally accountable policymaking, then, given my commitment to constitutional policymaking by the
judiciary, I would have to question the axiomatic character of the principle of electorally accountable policy-
making. Cf. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I, 42 (1979):
I realize that it may not be appropriate to demand justification of an axiom, for it is offered as a starting
point, a proposition that you cannot look behind. Yet there must be more that can be said about it.
Acceptance of an axiom must turn on something more than a momentary flash of intuition .... [T]he
axiom can be assessed in terms of its consequences and its underlying social vision. An axiom might at
first glance seem attractive enough, but its appeal may decline radically once its full implications are
understood.
11. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). See also ELY, supra
note 7, at I.
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judgments the Framers wrote into the text of the Constitution and there-
by constitutionalized. 12 The important such judgments fall into two cate-
gories. One category of judgments defines the structure of American govern-
ment by specifying the division of authority, first, between the federal govern-
ment and the governments of the states and, second, among the three
branches of the federal government-legislative, executive, and judicial. The
other category defines the limits of governmental authority vis-d-vis the indi-
vidual; this category of value judgments specifies certain aspects of the rela-
tionship that shall exist between the individual and government.13
The Supreme Court engages in interpretive review when it ascertains the
constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the value
judgments of which the Constitution consists-that is, by reference to a value
judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some particu-
lar provision of the text of the Constitution or in the overall structure of
government ordained by the Constitution. 14 Such review, is "interpretive"
because the Court reaches decision by interpreting-deciphering-the textual
provision (or the aspect of governmental structure) that is the embodiment of
the determinative value judgment. Interpretive review is a hermeneutical
enterprise; the effort is to ascertain, as accurately as available historical ma-
terials will permit, the character of a value judgment the Framers consti-
tutionalized at some point in the past. The Court engages in noninterpretive
review when it makes the determination of constitutionality by reference to a
value judgment other than one constitutionalized by the Framers. Such re-
view is "noninterpretive" because the Court reaches decision without really
interpreting, in the hermeneutical sense, any provision of the constitutional
text (or any aspect of governmental structure)'5--although, to be sure, the
12. The so-called "unwritten" constitution is a different matter, consisting of value judgments not plausi-
bly attributable to the Framers but nonetheless constitutionalized by the Supreme Court. See Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). The unwritten constitution is the constitution
generated by noninterpretive review. Hence, if noninterpretive review is illegitimate, in whole or in part, then
the unwritten constitution, as the tainted fruit of such review, is illegitimate too, in whole or in part.
13. See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 2 n.*: "Most other constitutional clauses concern 'housekeeping'
matters. These deal with details of the federal departments (for example, the minimum ages for elected national
officials) or with relations among the states (for example, the extradition clause)."
14. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 n.9 (1975):
The interpretive model ... certainly contemplates that the courts may look through the sometimes
opaque text to the purposes behind it in determining constitutional norms. Normative inferences may
be drawn from silences and omissions, from structures and relationships, as well as from explicit
commands.... What distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model is his insistence that
the only norms used in constitutional adjudication must be those inferable from the text-that the
Constitution must not be seen as licensing courts to articulate and apply contemporary norms not
demonstrably expressed or implied by the framers.
For an influential discussion of govemmental "structure" as a source of decisional norms in constitutional
cases, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
15. See ELY, supra note 7, at I (defining "interpretivism" as the position "that judges deciding constitu-
tional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution, " and "noninterpretivism" as "the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of refer-




Court may explain its decision with rhetoric designed to create the illusion
that it is merely "interpreting" or "applying" some constitutional provision. 16
"Interpretivism" refers to constitutional theory that claims that only
interpretive judicial review is legitimate and, in particular, that all noninter-
pretive review is illegitimate. "Noninterpretivism" describes constitutional
theory that claims that at least some noninterpretive review-noninterpretive
review with respect to at least some categories of constitutional questions,
with the categories specified by the noninterpretivist theory in question-is
legitimate too. (No contemporary constitutional theorist, for reasons explored
elsewhere in the work of which this Article is a part, seriously disputes the
legitimacy of interpretive review.)
That the Court rarely acknowledges that it exercises noninterpretive re-
view 17 is presently beside the point. What matters is that many, indeed most
constitutional decisions and doctrines of the modem period (concerning
human rights issues), as we'll later see, cannot fairly be understood as the
products of anything but noninterpretive review,' 8 and therefore cannot be
deemed legitimate unless the noninterpretive review that generated them can
be justified. It is also beside the point that one can imagine cases in which
there would be room for a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the
Framers constitutionalized a particular value judgment, 9 thereby making it
impossible to say that the Court's decisions (in such cases), striking down
challenged governmental policy choices, must be explained in terms of non-
interpretive rather than interpretive review.2 ° The decisions in virtually all
modem constitutional cases of consequence, again, cannot plausibly be ex-
plained except in terms of noninterpretive review, because in virtually no
such case can it plausibly be maintained that the Framers constitutionalized
the determinative value judgment.2'
16. For a comment on why "the Court has always, when plausible [and, indeed, even when not plausible],
tended to talk an interpretivist line" (id. at 3). see id. at 3-5. The fundamental reason, of course, is the suspect
legitimacy of a noninterpretivist line.
17. For a recent example of a rare acknowledgement to that effect, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
18. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 3, at 137 (it is "virtually impossible to justify the Court's actions [in
providing "vigorous protection for the constitutional rights of minorities"] on the ground that it is doing no more
than *finding' the law of the Constitution and fulfilling the intention of its framers."); Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 234 (1980) ("if you consider the evolution of
doctrines in just about any extensively-adjudicated area of constitutional law ... explicit reliance on [interpre-
tivist] sources has played a very small role compared to the elaboration of the Court's own precedents. It is
rather like having a remote ancestor who came over on the Mayflower."); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of
Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1193 (1977) ("the evolving content of constitutional law is not controlled, or
even significantly guided, by the Constitution, understood as an historical document."). See also Lusky, Public
Trial and Public Right: The Missing Bottom Line, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1980).
19. Or even cases in which there would be room for a reasonable difference ofopinion as to whether a value
judgment concededly constitutionalized by the Framers calls for a decision sustaining or for one striking down
the challenged governmental policy choice.
20. Cf. ELY, supra note 7, at 186 n. 10 (noting that even an interpretivist approach generates debatable
decisions).
21. Which is not to say that in such cases the Court does not try to maintain that the Framers constitution-
alized the determinative value judgment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Is noninterpretive review, whether of state or federal action, authorized
by the constitutional text? (Although we are committed to the principle of
electorally accountable policymaking, we are also committed to the principle
that such policymaking is constrained by the value judgments embodied in the
constitutional text.) The bare text is equivocal with respect even to most
interpretive review.22 No one has claimed, or could claim, that by itself the
text authorizes and thereby legitimates noninterpretive review-the enforce-
ment of value judgments other than those the Framers constitutionalized.
Does any provision (or provisions) of the constitutional text read in the
light of history authorize noninterpretive review? That is, did the Framers-
any Framers, whether those of the 1789 Constitution, the Bill of Rights (1791),
or, for example, the fourteenth amendment (1868)-intend that state or
federal action be subject to noninterpretive review, in particular by the Su-
preme Court? Bear in mind what it means to claim that the Framers author-
ized noninterpretive review; the claim is necessarily that at some point (or
points) in American history governmental officials delegated to the judiciary,
in particular to the Supreme Court, authority to enforce against government,
not particular value judgments the Framers had deliberated and constitu-
tionalized, but unspecified value judgments not constitutionalized or
even always foreseen by the Framers. That would have been a remarka-
ble delegation for politicians to grant to an institution like the Supreme
Court, given their commitment to policymaking-to decisions as to which
values shall prevail, and as to how those values shall be implemented-
by those accountable, unlike the Court, to the electorate. It is difficult enough
to defend even interpretive review by reference to the intentions of the
Framers. It is impossible to defend noninterpretive review in that manner.
Nonetheless, many have tried, and some still try. One of the more nota-
ble recent efforts to establish the pedigree of noninterpretive review by refer-
ence to the intentions of the Framers of the 1789 Constitution and the Bill of
Rights is that of Thomas Grey.23 Grey examines the antecedents and character
of the politico-legal theory of the American colonists in the period preceding
the Revolution and concludes that many subscribed to the notion of "funda-
mental" or "natural" law, superior even to legislative authority, and enforce-
able by the judiciary. (The reference here and the next few pages is to "natu-
ral law" in its primitive sense, by which law is understood not as a manmade
artifact, but as a set of norms that preexist, that are independent of, man's
creative activity-norms perhaps, but not necessarily, writ by a Deity.24)
Grey stops well short of contending that this notion of natural law was implicit
in either the 1789 Constitution or the Bill of Rights and wisely leaves open the
22. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 11-14 (1962).
23. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Rerolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
24. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
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crucial questions whether the notion, even if accepted to a significant extent
in the prerevolutionary period, was widespread in 1787-91 (the formative
constitutional period), and whether "[tlhe new practice of establishing a writ-
ten constitution, drawn up by a representative convention and ratified by the
people" didn't displace the notion of judicially enforceable natural, but un-
written, law. 5
Grey's and similar efforts are quixotic. The historical record simply does
not support the proposition that the Framers constitutionalized natural law.
John Ely's recent comments to that effect are quite sound.26 Moreover, even
if the Framers of the 1789 Constitution and the Bill of Rights had somehow
incorporated into those documents the judgment that natural law exists and
the judiciary ought to enforce it against government, it is not at all clear how
the judgment could have any normative force today, or sufficient force to
justify noninterpretive review,27 since today the idea that natural law exists
has very limited currency. "Law, good or bad," says H.L.A. Hart, "is a
25. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 893 (1978).
26. The historical record ... is not so uncomplicated as it is sometimes made to appear. Some of our
nation's founders did not find the concept [of natural law] intelligible in any context, and even those
who did "were seldom, if ever, guilty of confusing law with natural right." It therefore seems no
oversight that the Constitution at no point adverts to the concept. Of course the Declaration of
Independence had spoken in such terms. Part of the explanation for the difference is undoubtedly that
intellectual fashions had changed somewhat over that eventful decade and a half. But surely that can't
be all there was to it-ideas do not come and go so fast-and a more important factor seems to have
been the critical difference in function between the two documents. The Declaration of Independence
was, to put it bluntly, a brief (with certain features of an indictment). People writing briefs are likely,
and often well advised, to throw in arguments of every hue. People writing briefs for revolution are
obviously unlikely to have apparent positive law on their side, and are therefore well advised to rely on
natural law. This the argument for our Revolution did, combining natural law concepts with reference
to positive law, both English and colonial, to the genuine "will of the people," to the "rights of
Englishmen"--in short, with references to anything that seemed to help. "It was the quarrel with
Britain that forced Americans to reach upward and bring natural law down from the skies, to be
converted into a political theory for use as a weapon in constitutional argument; in that capacity it was
directed against British policies and was never intended as a method of analysing the rights and wrongs
of colonial life." The Constitution was not a brief, but a frame of government. A broadly accepted
natural law philosophy surely would have found a place within it, presumably in the Bill of Rights. But
such philosophies were not that broadly accepted. Since the earlier impetus that had moved the
Declaration, the need to "make a case," was no longer present, these controversial doctrines were
omitted, at least in anything resembling explicit form, from the later document.
ELY. supra note 7, at 48-49, quoting respectively, R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 27 (1975); J. POLE, THE
PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 11 (1978). See also Berns, The Constitution and the Adver-
sarial Society, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICA (forthcoming 1981, American Enterprise Insti-
tute); Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 893, 936-37 (1978).
27. See Levinson, Self-Evident Truths in the Declaration of Independence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 847, 856-57
(1979)(reviewing M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978), and G. WILLS,
INVENTING A.MERCIA (1978)):
[B]oth White and Wills, in their own ways establish the equally moribund nature of the secular
structures of thought that they examine. It is simply not open to an intellectually sophisticated modem
thinker to share Jefferson's world; in this sense, both authors could embrace the title of Daniel
Boorstin's brilliant work, The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson [1948].
It is a tribute to the hold of the Declaration over our consciousness that even today the most
widely discussed book in jurisprudence is [Ronald Dworkin's] Taking Rights Seriously [19771. Con-
temporary discussions of rights are, however, often like dazzling high-wire acts in which the acrobats
have not yet discovered that the pole on which they depend for balance has disappeared. One may
mumble the words of the Jeffersonian legacy, just as one may attend church in order to enjoy the ritual
and ceremony. One may even be thrilled by the recent Chinese rediscovery of the importance of
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manmade artifact which men create and add to the world by the exercise of
their will; it is not something already in the world that men discover through
the exercise of their reasoning powers.- 28 One might try to argue that the
judiciary should attempt at least to approximate the Framers' value judg-
ment 29 by substituting for the outmoded idea of natural law the modem idea of
an evolving societal morality and by searching out that morality and enforcing
it against government. But such an argument is fanciful at best. In searching
out and enforcing an evolving societal morality, even assuming such a thing
exists, indisputably the judiciary would be involved in creatively shaping-
not passively discovering and applying-fundamental law, and it is as plain as
such things can ever be that the Framers did not mean for the judiciary to
undertake such a function. As William Nelson has written:
[T]he Founders did not foresee that the Supreme Court would be an institution
that would change the Constitution. The Court was to be an agency of permanence
and stability. When opponents of the Constitution argued that "the power of
construing the laws according to the spirit of the constitution [would] enable that
court to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper," Hamilton an-
swered in the Federalist [#81] that such an argument was "made up altogether of
false reasoning upon misconceived fact'"--a conclusion which could "be inferred
with certainty, from the general nature of the judicial power .... " Contemporary
commentators were almost unanimous in assuming that it was "the duty ofjudges
to conserve the law, not to change it ... " Judges were "no more than the mouth
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings" sworn to decide cases
"according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pro-
nounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." They had no power
to repeal, to amend, to alter ... or to make new laws [for] in that case they would
become legislators .... and "a knowledge of mankind, and of Legislative af-
fairs... [could not] be presumed to belong in a higher... degree to the Judges
than to [legislators]." The special skill of judges lay in their knowledge of the
'strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them .. " Trained in an era when rapid social
change was only beginning to occur, lawyers belonging to the Revolutionary gen-
eration could find plausible what is for us a naive theory of the judicial function
and could imagine that the role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution would
be "to ascertain its meaning," not to fit it to new conditions as they arose.30
individual rights. But, just as sooner or later the acrobat must try to reach the security of the platform,
the conscientious thinker must ask what is the basis for his beliefs. And at this moment terror strikes.
ITlhere is no reason to believe that we can share the Founder's premises. There has been a notable
lack of success in constructing a contemporary foundation on which to build those rights we ought to
take seriously.
28. Hart, Law in the Perspective of Philosophy: 1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 538, 540 (1976). See also
ELY, supra note 7, at 50-54; Frankel, The Moral Environment of the Law,, 61 MINN. L. REV. 921, 946-49
(1977).
29. Assuming arguendo that the Framers made the judgment that natural law exists and the judiciary ought
to enforce it against government.
30. Nelson, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 500, 508-09 (1969). See also Berger, "The Supreme Court as a
Legislature": A Dissent, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 988, 990-99 (1979); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 142 (1956):
Whether the men at the Convention anticipated judicial review is an issue that will probably never
be settled; but there is not a single word in the records of the Convention or in the "Federalist Papers"
to suggest that they foresaw the central role the Court would from time to time assume as a policy-
maker and legislator in its own right.
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Note, however, that to say that the Framers did not intend the judiciary
to undertake a noninterpretive function is not necessarily to say that the
Framers intended the judiciary not to undertake such a function." Raoul
Berger argues that the Framers of the 1789 Constitution intended the judiciary
not to undertake policymaking in constitutional cases. His rationale is that the
Framers specifically rejected a proposal that the judicial branch of the federal
government participate in a Council of Revision, the responsibility of which
would have been "to examine every act of Congress and by its dissent to
constitute a veto."-32 According to Berger, the Framers "drew a line between
the judicial reviewing function, that is, policing grants of power to insure that
there were no encroachments beyond the grants, and legislative policymaking
within those bounds., 33 The historical record Berger examines does in fact
establish that the Framers decided against giving the judiciary any part of a
certain sort of veto over acts of Congress, a negative to be used, like the
Presidential veto, on any ground whatsoever. Nonetheless, Berger's argu-
ment must be rejected. Noninterpretive review need not constitute such an
all-purpose veto, and if it does not, if instead its character is much more
circumscribed, and if further the Framers did not even contemplate nonin-
terpretive review thus circumscribed, of course it cannot be said that the
Framers intended the judiciary not to exercise such review.34
Some theorists have attempted to justify noninterpretive review of state
action by reference to the intention of the Framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which was added to the Constitution in 1868 so as to establish certain
limits on the policymaking prerogatives of the states, in particular the former
slave states.35 One claim is that the Framers were imbued with the natural (or
"fundamental") law views of the abolitionists, embodied those views in sec-
tion one of the amendment, and intended that the judiciary enforce natural
law against the states.36 A similar claim is that the due process clause of
31. If the Framers intended that the judiciary not undertake noninterpretive review of any sort, the exercise
of noninterpretive review by the modem Supreme Court would be not merely extraconstitutional-beyond any
value judgment the Framers constitutionalized-which it is, but contraconstitutional--contrary to one of those
judgments. For an example of reliance on this distinction, see CHOPER, supra note 3, at xvii-xviii: "At various
points throughout this book, I have made reference to statements by the framers of the Constitution .... I have
not used these materials to suggest that the major propositions advocated in the book were originally ordained.
Rather, . . .I mean only to show that my proposals are not at war with original intent [not, i.e., contraconstitu-
tional].'" For other examples, see ELY, supra note 7, at 123 & 236 n.37.
Arguably, the Supreme Court's decision in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), was contraconstitutional and so poses a problem of legitimacy distinct from the problem posed by
constitutional policymaking that generates (merely) extraconstitutional decisions. My concern in this Article,
however, is the legitimacy of extraconstitutional policymaking, not contraconstitutional policymaking. Virtually
none of the modem Court's constitutional policymaking is contraconstitutional.
32. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300 (1977).
33. Id. at 302.
34. Cf. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1978). By the same
token, if the Framers did not contemplate noninterpretive review thus circumscribed-and certainly they did
not contemplate anything like the noninterpretive review exercised by the modem Supreme Court-it cannot be
said that the Framers intended that the judiciary exercise such review. The justification for the practice must be
sought elsewhere.
35. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
36. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716 (1975).
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section one was intended to constitutionalize natural law or some functional
equivalent, such as norms "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
37
However, recent, exhaustive research confirms the conclusion that the
Framers intended the fourteenth amendment to have a very narrow scope and
that neither section one in its entirety nor the due process clause in particular
was meant to be a vehicle for the constitutionalization of natural law.3s
One of the most distinctive recent efforts to justify noninterpretive re-
view by reference to the intentions of the Framers is that of John Ely. 39
Interpretivists argue that the judiciary should enforce, as constitutional con-
straints against government, only value judgments constitutionalized by the
Framers, and therefore must not enforce constraints the Framers did not
specify. But, says Ely, two constitutional provisions-the ninth amendment
37. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61, 67
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (due process protects "ultimate decency in a civilized society"; due process
subsumes "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples").
38. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 1-245 (1977). See also ELY, supra note 7, at
49-50:
Natural law was also part of the rhetoric of antislavery, but again it was just one arrow in the
quiver. As suited their purposes, the abolitionists, like the revolutionaries before them, argued both
positive law, now in the form of existing constitutional provisions, and natural law. And for them too,
the latter reference was virtually unavoidable, since it took a purity of spirit that transcended judgment
not to recognize that the original Constitution, candidly considered, not only did not outlaw slavery,
but deliberately protected it. "When it was the fashion to speak and write of 'natural' law very few
stopped to consider the exact significance of that commonplace of theological, economic, literary, and
scientific, as well as political, thought. Particularly is this true of the use oftheories of natural law in the
heat of controversies. At such times, it is the winning of a cause, not the discussion of problems of
ontology, which occupies men's minds." Justice Accused [1975], Robert Cover's fine recent book on
antislavery and the judicial process, corroborates the conclusion that for early American lawyers,
references to natural law and natural rights functioned as little more than signals for one's sense that
the law was not as one felt it should be. This is not to say that "natural law" was entirely without
perceived legal significance. It was thought to be invocable interstitially, when no aspect of positive
law provided an applicable rule for the case at hand. But it was subordinate to applicable statutes and
well-settled precedent as well as to constitutional provisions, and not generally perceived as a source of
values on whose basis positive law could be constitutionally upset.
Quoting B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 332-33 (1931). With respect to the
due process clause in particular, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 193-220 (1977); ELY, supra
note 7, at 14-22.
39. Noninterpretive review with respect to both freedom of expression and equal protection issues (among
others) Ely terms "participational review." The other he terms "substantive" review. See, e.g.,ELY, supra
note 7, at 182. Ely expresses doubt as to whether his theory "is properly regarded as a form ofinterpretivism or
instead is more comfortably described as sitting somewhere between an interpretivist and a noninterpretivist
approach"-"a question," says Ely, "that seems neither answerable nor important." Id. at 12. (On the distinc-
tion between "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism," see text following note 16 supra.) See also id. at 88 n*:
"I don't think this terminological question is either entirely coherent orespecially important." Mindful of Ely's
expressed doubt, I have chosen to label Ely's theory noninterpretivist. That is, I have chosen to label the
constitutional policymaking Ely defends---"participational review"--a species of noninterpretive review, as Ely
himself once did. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978). 1
want to emphasize, however, that nothing in my critique of Ely's theory depends on the label I have affixed to it.
Nonetheless, in terms of the distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review I marked out earlier in
this Article (see text accompanying notes 11-16 supra), Ely's "participational" review seems to me clearly a
species of noninterpretive review (policymaking as opposed to an authentically hermeneutical enterprise). See
also Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 3, 9 (1981) (explaining why "[t]he form of noninterpretivism that is closest to pure interpretivism, a form
that I label 'neo-interpretivism,' is represented by Ely."). The reader, of course, can decide what label seems
apt.
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and the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment-
disclose the Framers' judgment that individuals shall be deemed to have
constitutional rights beyond merely those specified by the Framers.40 The
ninth amendment, which, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was intended to
constrain only the federal government,4' provides that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." The privileges or immunities clause provides
that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Neither the language
nor the legislative history of the ninth amendment, nor the language, nor,
according to Ely,42 the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, indi-
cates what those unspecified rights might be. Thus, concludes Ely, if the
judiciary should enforce, as interpretivists argue it should, value judgments
constitutionalized by the Framers, it must enforce the value judgments dis-
closed by the ninth amendment and the privileges or immunities clause and
therefore must somehow define and enforce constraints the Framers did not
specify-the unenumerated norms to which the ninth amendment and the
privileges or immunities clause refer. 43 For that reason, says Ely, interpre-
tivism-the theory that the judiciary may not enforce constraints not specified
by the Framers-is an impossible position to maintain.44
It bears emphasis that unlike most other efforts to establish the pedigree
of noninterpretive review by reference to the intentions of the Framers, Ely's
argument is not predicated on the inaccurate notion that the Framers constitu-
tionalized natural law. Indeed, as we've seen, Ely vigorously and effectively
rejects that notion. Nonetheless, Ely's claims must themselves be rejected.
Consider first Ely's ninth amendment point. Even if the ninth amendment
discloses the judgment that individuals shall be deemed to have rights against
the federal government beyond those specified by the Framers, that judgment
does not itself authorize noninterpretive review of federal action-it does not
authorize the judiciary to define what those rights shall be and enforce them.
Ely anticipates this criticism, but his response is flawed:
It would be a cheap shot to note that there is not legislative history specifically
indicating an intention that the Ninth Amendment was to receive judicial enforce-
ment. There was at the time of the original Constitution little legislative history
indicating that any particular provision was to receive judicial enforcement: the
Ninth Amendment was not singled out one way or the other.45
40. ELY, supra note 7. at 22-30, 34-38.
41. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
42. See ELY, supra note 7, at 22-30. But see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 20-51 (1977).
43. See ELY, supra note 7, at 11-41. See also Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with
Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 502 (1979).
44. See ELY, supra note 7. at 13:
[I]nterpretivism runs into trouble-trouble precisely on its own terms, and so serious as to be disposi-
tive. For the constitutional document itself, the interpretivist's Bible, contains several provisions
whose invitation to look beyond their four comers-whose invitation, if you will, to become at least to
that extent a noninterpretivist-cannot be construed away.
45. Id. at 40.
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But, as I suggest elsewhere in the work of which this Article is a part, even if
the Framers did not authorize interpretive review of federal action-judicial
enforcement of norms specified by the Framers-it matters little, for there is a
compelling functional justification for such review. Ely's response, however,
completely overlooks the fact that the functional considerations that explain
and justify interpretive review of federal action under the first or fourth
amendment, say, have utterly no force with respect to noninterpretive review
under the ninth amendment.
The justification for interpretive review of federal action is that without
it, constraints specified by the Framers would not have the status of "su-
preme law" that the Framers plainly intended them to have. But that cannot
be the justification for noninterpretive review under the ninth amendment.
Unlike interpretive review, noninterpretive review does not secure the status
of existing constraints-constraints not previously specified by the Framers-
as supreme law, but entails judicial creation of new constraints-constraints
not previously specified or, for the most part, even foreseen by the Framers.
There is, after all, a radical difference between judicial enforcement of exist-
ing constitutional constraints, which is interpretive review, and judicial crea-
tion of new ones, which is noninterpretive review. If the judiciary does not
exercise noninterpretive review under the ninth amendment, the status of
existing constraints as supreme law is not imperiled; the judiciary simply
declines to fashion new constitutional constraints. Thus, not only does the
legislative history of the ninth amendment disclose no judgment by the
Framers that.the judiciary should exercise noninterpretive review of federal
action, but, significantly, the functional considerations that justify interpre-
tive review of federal action under other constitutional provisions simply have
no force with respect to noninterpretive review under the ninth amendment.46
Of course, if the ninth amendment had been intended to constitutionalize
a determinate set of constraints on the federal government, albeit unenumer-
ated constraints, it would then be possible to maintain that judicial enforce-
ment of the ninth amendment does secure the status of existing constraints-
constraints previously constitutionalized (but not enumerated or otherwise
46. See Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (1980): "[Madison explained] that the
Bill of Rights would impel the judiciary 'to resist encroachments upon rights expressly stipulated for ... by the
declaration of rights,' and reinforces the conclusion that the courts were not empowered to enforce the retained
and unenumerated rights." Quoting I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836)(print bearing
running title "History of Congress").
In his recent Holmes Lectures, Charles Black has argued that the ninth amendment authorizes noninterpre-
tive review of state as well as federal action. By itself the ninth amendment constrains only federal action. See
note 41 and accompanying text supra. Black's claim is that section one of the fourteenth amendment, which
constrains state action, should be taken to incorporate the ninth no less than the other amendments of the Bill of
Rights that have been declared applicable against the states. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 23-27
(Apr. 1979) (unpublished lectures in Oliver Wendell Holmes series, delivered at Harvard Law School). For an
opposing view, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-65 (1977). Black's claim must, however, be
rejected. The legislative history of the fourteenth amendment simply does not support the proposition that the
Framers intended the fourteenth amendment to incorporate any or all of the Bill of Rights. See text accompany-
ing notes 101-05 and note 105 infra.
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specified) by the Framers-as supreme law. But history does not disclose that
the Framers intended to incorporate by reference into the ninth amendment a
determinate set of constraints. (If it did disclose such an intention, there
would still remain the problem that history does not disclose what those
constraints might be.)47 Certainly Ely does not claim that history discloses any
such intention; indeed, Ely expressly rejects the notion, for example, that the
ninth amendment was intended to incorporate by reference constraints de-
rived from "natural law."-
48
Consequently, an interpretivist can easily reply to Ely that while func-
tional considerations fairly compel the judiciary to enforce constraints speci-
fied by the Framers, those same considerations do nothing to underwrite
judicial creation of constraints not specified or even foreseen by the Framers.
So far as the ninth amendment is concerned, Ely is wrong: interpretivism is
not an impossible position to maintain.49
The fatal problem with Ely's privileges-or-immunities-clause point is that
it rests on an inaccurate reading of the intentions of the Framers of the
fourteenth amendment. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the
Framers, in using the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," meant only to protect, against state action discriminating on
the basis of race, a narrow category of "fundamental" rights: those pertaining
to the physical security of one's person, freedom of movement, and capacity
to make contracts (including contracts to work), and to acquire, hold, and
transfer chattels and land--"life, liberty, and property" in the original
sense.50 But if that historical conclusion is controversial-indeed, if I am
47. For one view of what history discloses, or doesn't disclose, about the ninth amendment, see Berger,
The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980).
48. See ELY, supra note 7, at 39.
49. "There is a difference," writes Ely, "'between ignoring a provision, such as the First Amendment,
because you don't like its substantive limitations and ignoring a provision, such as the Ninth Amendment,
because you don't like its institutional implications. But it's hard to make it a difference that should count." Id.
at 38. It's not at all hard to make it a difference that should count. For a court to ignore a provision like the first
amendment is to ignore a constraint specified by the Framers and intended by them to have the status of
supreme law. But for it to ignore the ninth amendment is not to ignore any constraint specified by the Framers.
See also Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and Distrust, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 209, 209 n.7 (1981):
The ninth amendment.., is relatively easy to deal with from an interpretivist perspective. On its face,
the language of the amendment does not create any rights; it simply states that the Constitution by its
own terms does not take away any rights which citizens might already have. Nothing in the amendment
addresses the question of whether Congress or the states can abridge such rights.
50. The Framers of the fourteenth amendment meant also to prohibit any state from discriminating on the
basis of race with respect to judicial protection of those fundamental rights. See text accompanying note 100
infra. (A careful reading of Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823), which figures in so many discussions of the original understanding of the privileges or immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 28-30, discloses only one "privilege or immunity"
not subsumed by the description of "fundamental" rights in the text accompanying this note (or by judicial
protection of those rights): the right to vote. And everyone agrees that Washington was in error in listing that
right.) Moreover, the Framers did not differentiate the functions of the three main clauses of section one of the
fourteenth amendment: the privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses. See R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18 (1977); Karst. Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. I, 15 (1977). Ely, discussing the original understanding of the three clauses,
presupposes a functional differentiation among them, see ELY, supra note 7, at 14-32, and in that respect too his
discussion is historically unsound.
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wrong in believing that the original understanding of the fourteenth amend-
ment was so narrow-no matter. My error would in no way strengthen Ely's
position. Even if the original understanding was somewhat broader, the fact
remains that there is simply no credible evidence to support Ely's claim that
"the Privileges or Immunities Clause... was a delegation to future constitu-
tional decision-makers [i.e., the judiciary] to protect certain rights that the
[Constitution] neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any specific
way gives directions for finding."- 5' It was simply not the intention of the
Framers of the fourteenth amendment to authorize the judiciary to exercise
noninterpretive review under any "open-ended" provision.52
At the close of his effort to root noninterpretive review in the language
and original understanding of both the ninth amendment and the privileges or
immunities clause, Ely sounds a curious note. He suggests that the legitimacy
of noninterpretive review
is a question on which history cannot have the last word, at least not the last
affirmative word. If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitu-
tion's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly
inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, respon-
sible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply
should stay away from them.53
First, Ely is wrong. History could have had the last affirmative word. If in fact
the Framers had authorized the judiciary to exercise (some sort of) noninter-
51. ELY, supra note 7, at 28. See also id. at 30.
52. See Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695,
697-98:
In the first place, not even a scintilla of evidence supports the argument that the framers and the
ratifiers of the various amendments intended the judiciary to develop new individual rights, which
correspondingly create new disabilities for democratic government. Although we do not know pre-
cisely what the phrase "'privileges or immunities" meant to the framers, a variety of explanations exist
for its open-endedness other than that the framers intended to delegate to courts the power to make up
the privileges or immunities in the clause.
The obvious possibility, of course, is that the people who framed the privileges-or-immunities
clause did have an idea of what they meant, but that their idea has been irretrievably lost in the mists of
history. If that is true, it is hardly a ground for judicial extrapolation from the clause.
Perhaps a more likely explanation is that the framers and ratifiers themselves were not certain of
their intentions. Although the judiciary must give content to vague phrases, it need not go well beyond
what the framers and ratifiers reasonably could be supposed to have had in mind. If the framers really
intended to delegate to judges the function of creating new rights by the method of moral philosophy,
one would expect that they would have said so. They could have resolved their uncertainty by writing a
ninth amendment that declared: "The Supreme Court shall, from time to time, find and enforce such
additional rights as may be determined by moral philosophy, or by consideration of the dominant ideas
of republican government." But if that was what they really intended, they were remarkably adroit in
managing not to say so.
It should give theorists of the open-ended Constitution pause, moreover, that not even the most
activist courts have ever grounded their claims for legitimacy in arguments along those lines. Courts
closest in time to the adoption of the Constitution and various amendments, who might have been
expected to know what powers had been delegated to them, never offered argument along the lines
advanced by Professor Michelman. The Supreme Court, in fact, has been attacked repeatedly through-
out its history for exceeding its delegated powers; yet this line of defense seems never to have occurred
to its members. For these reasons I remain unpersuaded that the interpretivist argument can be
escaped.
53. ELY, supra note 7, at 41.
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pretive review, there would be no problem of legitimacy. To the contrary,
there would be a serious question concerning the legitimacy of the judiciary's
forsaking that office. Again, our societal commitment is not simply to the
principle of electorally accountable policymaking; we are committed a- well
to the coequal principle that such policymaking shall be constrained by the
value judgments the Framers constitutionalized, including judgments about
what practices the various institutions of government may or must undertake.
But, second, what difference does it make that in fact the Framers did not
authorize the judiciary to exercise noninterpretive review, "[i]f a principled
approach to [noninterpretive review] can ... be developed, one that is
not ... inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative
democracy"? For in that case the problem of legitimacy will have been
solved: it will have been shown that noninterpretive review need not be
inconsistent with our commitment to the principle of electorally accountable
policymaking. Therefore, given that in his book Ely argues that a principled
approach, consistent with the commitment to representative democracy, can
be developed,54 it is puzzling why Ely even tries (struggles?) to establish the
implausible historical proposition that the intentions of the Framers ordain (at
least some) noninterpretive review. The contrary proposition-that the inten-
tions of the Framers do not warrant noninterpretive review-should be, for
Ely, inconsequential.
There is no plausible textual or historical justification for constitutional
policymaking by the judiciary-no way to avoid the conclusion that nonin-
terpretive review, whether of state or federal action, cannot be justified by
reference either to the text or to the intention of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. The justification for the practice, if there is one, must be functional: if
noninterpretive review serves a crucial governmental function that no other
practice realistically can be expected to serve, and if it serves that function in
a manner that somehow accommodates the principle of electorally account-
able policymaking, then that function constitutes the justification for nonin-
terpretive review. Those who seek to defend noninterpretive review-
"judicial activism"-do it a disservice when they resort to implausible textual
or, more commonly, historical arguments; nothing is gained but much credi-
bility is lost when the case for noninterpretive review is built upon such frail
and vulnerable reeds.
C.
I now want to set forth the essential position of those who argue that only
interpretive review is legitimate-that the judiciary may not legitimately en-
force any values not constitutionalized by the Framers. For the interpretivist,
as for others, it is axiomatic that governmental decisions as to which values,
among competing values, shall prevail, and as to how those values shall be
54. See id. at 73-183.
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implemented, should be subject to control by persons accountable, directly or
indirectly, to the electorate. The interpretivist does not overlook the fact that
there are constitutional constraints on electorally accountable policymaking.
But those limits consist solely of the value judgments constitutionalized by
the Framers. The will and judgment of persons accountable to the electorate
should be limited not by the countervailing will and judgment of the judiciary,
but only by the will and judgment of the Framers, which it is the judiciary's
office to enforce.5 5 Interpretivism reflects a popular-"civics book"-under-
standing of the division of governmental authority in the American political
system, and that, of course, is part of its appeal: In the United States, the
basic function of the legislature is to make policy, sometimes in conjunction
with the other electorally accountable branch of government, the executive;
the basic function of the executive is to administer policy; and the sole func-
tion of the judiciary, in constitutional cases, is to police policymaking and
administration by keeping it within constitutional bounds.5 6 According to in-
terpretivism, it is illegitimate, in terms of the "democratic" norms of Ameri-
can political culture, for legislative policymaking and executive policy admin-
istration to exceed constitutional bounds. But it is also illegitimate for the
judiciary to engage in constitutional policymaking-noninterpretive judicial
review-as opposed to constitutional interpretation. The question of the pre-
cise constitutional bounds that legislative policymaking and executive policy
administration may not exceed must be answered by interpretation, not
55. Ely's characterization of the interpretivist position is flawed. He writes:
[Tihe interpretivist takes his values from the Constitution, which means, since the Constitution itself
was submitted for and received popular ratification, that they ultimately come from the people. Thus
the judges do not check the people, the Constitution does, which means the people are ultimately
checking themselves.
Id. at 8. That argument, says Ely,
is largely a fake. Given what it takes to amend the Constitution, it is likely that a recent amendment will
represent, if not necessarily a consensus, at least the sentiment of a contemporary majority. The
amendments most frequently in issue in court, however-to the extent that they ever represented the
"voice of the people"-represent the voice of people who have been dead for a century or two....
[Jiudges are [not] simply applying the people's will. Incompatibility with democratic theory is a
problem that seems to confront interpretivist and noninterpretivist alike.
Id. at 11-12. But sophisticated interpretivists, like Robert Bork, don't proffer the argument Ely rejects. Rather,
they argue that the (only) value judgments that legitimately constrain electorally accountable policymaking are
those constitutionalized by the Framers. (They do not address the issue whether those judgments now represent
or indeed ever represented "'the people.") That argument creates no problems for interpretivists, however,
since they are committed not merely to the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, but also to the
principle that such policymaking is constrained by the value judgments the Framers constitutionalized.
56. In nonconstitutional cases, of course, the judiciary exercises concededly legitimate policymaking func-
tions, those of legislating the "common law" and of fleshing out, or filling in the interstices of, statutory law.
(There is no sharp line between those two functions. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (1973).) Both functions, however, are
undertaken by the judiciary in its role as delegate of the legislature; whatever policy choices the judiciary makes
in nonconstitutional cases are subject to revision by the ordinary processes of electorally accountable policy-
making. In that sense, nonconstitutional policymaking by the judiciary is electorally accountable, even if the
judges themselves are not. See CHOPER, supra note 3, at 132; ELY, supra note 7, at 4; Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH L. REV. 1162, 1166 (1977). Cf. ELY, supra note 7, at 68: "All too often
commentators working in fields other than constitutional law, fields where appeals to this sort of filtered
consensus may make sense, seek to transfer their analytical techniques to the constitutional law area without
dropping a stitch."
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policymaking-that is, answered by reference to the value judgments consti-
tutionalized by the Framers. When the judiciary invokes the Constitution to
invalidate challenged governmental action not contrary to any of those judg-
ments, it frustrates the will of electorally accountable officials acting within
their constitutional bounds and, moreover, exceeds its own constitutional
bounds and thus acts lawlessly.
Interpretivism has many proponents and many more adherents. Among
the better known contemporary proponents are a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, William Rehnquist, 7 and a legal scholar, Raoul Berger.
5 8
Perhaps the most able and articulate proponent of interpretivism-and there-
fore opponent of noninterpretivism-is Robert Bork, former Solicitor General
of the United States and now Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law at
Yale. Throughout this Article I take Bork's views to constitute an exemplar of
contemporary interpretivism. 59 Therefore, I want to quote some key passages
of Bork's provocative lecture on "the proper role of the Supreme Court under
the Constitution": 60
Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain
enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of
majorities by, the Constitution.
*.. [I]t follows that the Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the
Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom. If it does
not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or worse if it
pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections, the
Court... abets the tyranny either of the majority or of the minority.
[N]o argument that is both coherent and respectable can be made supporting a
Supreme Court that "chooses fundamental values" because a Court that makes
rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions
of a democratic society.
Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be pre-
ferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.
The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications,
and not construct new rights.
Where the Constitution does not embody the moral or ethical choice, the
judge has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the com-
munity judgment embodied in the statute. That, by definition, is an inadequate
basis for judicial supremacy.
* Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it
clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution.
57. See Rehnquist, Tie Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
58. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
59. See Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695,
695: -1 represent that school of thought which insists that the judiciary invalidate the work of the political
branches only in accordance with an inference whose underlying premise is fairly discoverable in the Constitu-
tion itself.rA
60. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971).
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There is no principled way in which anyone can define the spheres in which
liberty is required and the spheres in which equality is required. These are matters
of morality, of judgment, of prudence. They belong, therefore, to the political
61
community. In the fullest sense, these are political questions.
Using Professor Wechsler's requirement of neutral principles62 as a point
of departure, Bork continues:
Recognition of the need for principle is only the first step, but once that step is
taken much more follows. Logic has a life of its own, and devotion to principle
requires that we follow where logic leads.
We have not carried the idea of neutrality far enough. We have been talking
about neutrality in the application of principles. If judges are to avoid imposing
their own values upon the rest of us, however, they must be neutral as well in the
definition and the derivation of principles.
It is easy enough to meet the requirement of neutral application by stating a
principle so narrowly that no embarrassment need arise in applying it to all cases it
subsumes, a tactic often urged by proponents of "judicial restraint." But that
solves very little. It certainly does not protect the judge from the intrusion of his
own values.
63
Bork suggests that his view is the professed (though not the actual) view
of the Supreme Court,64 and he seizes on that profession as evidence that his
view is-or that the Court thinks it is-the prevailing popular view:
The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results, and most particularly its con-
troversial results, do not spring from the mere will of the Justices in the majority
but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers,




Critics of interpretivism-who typically, of course, are defenders of non-
interpretivism-achieve nothing by pretending that interpretivism is not a
forceful theory. Several lines of attack on interpretivism, which I'll briefly
mention now, should be rejected outright. Interpretivism posits a commit-
ment to the principle of "majoritarian" policymaking in the sense of policy-
making that is electorally accountable. The anti-interpretivist claim that, in
the United States, policymaking is not all that majoritarian, in the sense that
often it is not nearly as reflective of the sentiments of actual majorities as
61. Id. at 3, 6, 8, 10-Il, 12.
62. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See also
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978).
63. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 6-7 (1971).
64. Bork is wrong: The Court does not invariably profess an interpretivist view. See, e.g., Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
65. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971).
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some persons think, is beside the point even if true-and doubtless it is true.66
For example, Geoffrey Hazard has recently written that
most legislation emanating from legislatures in modem times is chiefly the product
of committees and experts, and sometimes committees of experts. The same is
true of administrative agencies, which produce the bulk of contemporary legisla-
tion .... [I]f... neither Congress nor the agencies adequately express public
sentiment, it is hard to see why the Supreme Court should be subject to special
criticism because it also does not express that sentiment.
67
But Hazard is wrong. It is not at all hard to see why. What is crucial about
majoritarian policymaking, unlike constitutional policymaking by the Su-
preme Court, is that policy decisions are made by those accountable, even if
not always responsive, to electoral majorities. True, that accountability may
be only indirect. But it is electoral accountability nonetheless, and that fact,
which has crucial theoretical significance, 6n has great practical importance as
well. As Robert Dahl has put it in his classic study:
[T]he radical democrats who, unlike Madison, insist upon the decisive importance
of the election process in the whole grand strategy of democracy are essentially
correct. To be sure, if the social prerequisites of polyarchy do not exist, then the
election process cannot mitigate, avoid, or displace hierarchical government. But
if the social prerequisites of polyarchy do exist, then the election is the critical
technique for insuring that governmental leaders will be relatively responsive to
non-leaders; other techniques depend for their efficacy primarily upon the ex-
istence of election and the social prerequisites.69
Professor Hazard also notes that "it can be said that through various
mechanisms internal to legislatures and external to administrative agencies,
the 'general will' is somehow made to infuse statutes and administrative regu-
lations so that they are withal the product of a democratic process.- 70 "But,"
he says, "even if that is so, it has to be demonstrated why, by some compar-
able mechanism, the 'general will' does not also infuse decisional lawmaking
in courts."-7' Again Hazard misses the point. What is crucial is electoral
accountability, not degree of responsiveness to majority sentiments. Beyond
that, as a presumptive matter electoral accountability makes for greater re-
sponsiveness; certainly the burden is on Hazard to demonstrate the contrary.
And, if the forgoing passage by Dahl is accurate, it makes for greater respon-
siveness as an experiential, real-world matter as well.72
66. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
67. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1978).
68. See also Holland, American Liberals andJudicialActivism: Alexander Bickels Appealfrom the Old to
the New, 51 IND. L.J. 1025, 1041 (1976). The problem, after all, is one of constitutional theory, not political
science.
69. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125 (1956). One reason for insisting on electorally
accountable policymaking is precisely the difficulty of knowing, with respect to many issues, just what the
sentiments of an actual majority are.
70. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1978).
71. Id.
72. See also CHOPER, supra note 3, at 29-38.
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The anti-interpretivist claim that nonjudicial policymakers are not always
accountable in any very meaningful sense73-a lame-duck or second-term
President, for example, or the members of the Federal Reserve Board-is
very weak. First, the principal such policymakers, legislators, are meaning-
fully accountable-at least, the vast majority, all those seeking reelection,
are. Second, whatever nonjudicial policymakers are not meaningfully ac-
countable hold office only for comparatively short periods of time and so (1)
are not likely to be out of touch with dominant political sentiments and in any
event (2) can frustrate such sentiments only for short periods; moreover-and
this is crucial-their decisions are subject to revision by the ordinary proc-
esses of electorally accountable policymaking. 74 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, given our commitment to the principle of electorally accountable
policymaking, the claim that not all nonjudicial policymakers are meaning-
fully accountable counts less as a reason to applaud the existence of electorally
unaccountable judicial policymakers, than to make nonjudicial policymakers
who are not meaningfully accountable, truly accountable. 75 (The claim that
the judiciary is not significantly less accountable than many other govern-
mental policymakers is simply not true. The Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, which are the chief constitutional policymakers in the United
States, are not electorally accountable at all.)
Nor will it do to attack interpretivism by confusing it with what is es-
sentially a straw man, "literalism," and then demonstrating the obvious in-
firmity of the latter. No notable constitutional theorist, to my knowledge, has
ever contended that the judiciary should enforce constitutional provisions
according to their "plain meaning" and should studiously ignore all else,
including the original understanding of the provisions. First, many important
provisions-e.g., "due process of law,". "equal protection of the laws,"
"freedom of speech"-have no plain meaning. Second, even the most ardent
interpretivists recognize that what has priority is not the particular configura-
tion of words the Framers used in drafting a constitutional provision, but
rather the value judgment the Framers meant to embody in those words.76
Ascertaining the precise character of the Framers' value judgments often
requires reference to historical materials that disclose the Framers' inten-
tions .7 7
73. See, e.g., Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1110 (1977).
74. See McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 HOUS. L. REV. 354,361-62
(1966):
One would do well ... by recalling that the status of... officials [of independent agencies] has not
escaped criticism .... Congress can define their powers, limit their policy discretion, overcome their
decisions and actions by ordinary legislation, and speed their removal from office by granting dismissal
authority to the President or to its own officers.
75. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962): "[l]mpurities and imperfections, if such
they be, in one part of the system are no argument for total departure from the desired norm in another part."
See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 141 (1977); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to
Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 131 n.66 (1978).
76. See, e.g., Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981).
77. See note 14 supra. See also Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Originil Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 205-09 (1980).
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Similarly, so far as I am aware, no theorist has ever argued that the
judiciary should invalidate only political practices that were present to the
minds of the Framers and that the Framers meant to ban. The interpretivist
concedes that the judiciary may, even should, strike down political practices
that were not present to the minds of the Framers and that, therefore, the
Framers could not have specifically intended to ban. But invalidation of such
a political practice is legitimate, according to interpretivism, only if the prac-
tice is the analogue of a practice the Framers did contemplate and meant to
ban, different in no constitutionally significant respect from the practice the
Framers specifically intended to ban. 78 After all, enforcing value judgments
the Framers constitutionalized certainly requires invalidation of practices
different in no significant respect from those the Framers banned.79 Thus, for
example, the interpretivist need not oppose Supreme Court decisions subject-
ing wiretaps and electronic surveillance to the same fourth amendment
standards as physical "searches and seizures." 80 On the other hand, the
interpretivist must oppose the Court's decisions invalidating racially segre-
gated public schooling and antimiscegenation laws, 8' because those practices
were present to the minds of the Framers but the Framers chose not to ban
them; those decisions cannot fairly be characterized as enforcing value judg-
82ments the Framers constitutionalized. At any rate, interpretivism is not
literalism of any sort; to demonstrate the patent inadequacy of the latter is not
to attack the former.
83
78. The matter of analogues is discussed in text at page 301 infra.
79. See ELY, supra note 2, at 13:
[Tihe job of the person interpreting [a constitutional] provision, [interpretivists would say], is to
identify the sorts of evils against which the provision was directed and to move against their con-
temporary counterparts. Obviously this will be difficult, but it will remain interpretivism-a determi-
nation of "the present scope and meaning of a decision that the nation, at an earlier time, articulated
and enacted into the constitutional text."
Quoting Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972). See also Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 221 (1980); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36, 72 (1873):
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in [the protection of the Civil War Amend-
ments]. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any
question of construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican
peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within
our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed
by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection
will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent.
80. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). (Of course, interpretivists may disagree among
themselves as to whether or not a challenged political practice is in fact an analogue of a practice the Framers
contemplated and meant to ban. See, e.g., id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). No one ever claimed that an
interpretivist approach avoided debatable answers.). See also White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme
Court: The Contemporary Debate and the "Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 168 (1979):
Protecting a couple's right to sexual intimacy, for example, requires a different technique of judicial
interpretation from protecting persons against electronic eavesdropping. In the latter, judges merely
extrapolate the original meaning of "search and seizure" to a 20th century technological context; in the
former, judges create a constitutional right of privacy by "discovering" an unenumerated value of
privacy in the design of the Constitution.
81. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967)(antimiscegenation laws); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (segregated public schooling).
82. See text accompanying notes 150-67 infra.
83. Other lines of attack on interpretivism are considered below.
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The final anti-interpretivist claim I want to consider at this point posits
that generally constitutional provisions should be construed broadly, gener-
ously, because, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in one of the most fre-
quently quoted statements in all of constitutional law, "we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding." 84 The Constitution, said
Marshall, is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs .... It would have been an
unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided
for as they occur. ' ' 85 The very nature of the Constitution, an organic charter
of government, the argument runs, is not congenial to interpretivism, which
would confine all later generations of Americans to the value judgments of the
Framers' generation. Moreover, the argument continues, the Framers doubt-
less did not mean to confine posterity to their own late-eighteenth century
vision, for that would have been a cautious, conservative intention, not at all
characteristic of the Framers, who were bold men, architects of an ambitious
new government.
86
Although in some respects that argument has merit, as a response to
interpretivism it is wholly inadequate. It is one thing to construe broadly a
constitutional provision granting a particular power to government, in the
sense and with the consequence of sustaining an electorally accountable-
typically, a legislative-policy choice that the Framers might not have con-
templated government would make or need to make. That is what Marshall
did in McCulloch v. Maryland, in which he made the statements quoted
above. It is a radically different thing to construe broadly a constitutional
provision limiting the power of government, in the sense and with the con-
sequence of striking down an electorally accountable policy choice on the
basis of no value judgment fairly attributable to the Framers. Interpretivism
opposes the latter, not the former.87 The latter is countermajoritarian and thus
poses the problem of legitimacy, which, in the interpretivist's view, is insolu-
ble. The former is not countermajoritarian; in fact it does not even involve the
judiciary's broad construction of a power-granting provision of the Constitu-
tion so much as the judiciary's deference to the electorally accountable
policymaker's impliedly broad construction of the provision. Listen again-to
Marshall in McCulloch, sustaining a congressional act by reasoning that the
new federal government could not hope to function effectively without some
latitude under the power-granting provisions of the Constitution:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation
essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these
powers, to insure.., their beneficial execution. This could not be done by con-
84. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
85. Id. at 415.
86. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103-10 (1962).
87. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 284 (1977).
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fiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of
Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to
the end. This provision s is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To
have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, exe-
cute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instru-
ment, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise
attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all,
must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.89
Quite likely, then, for the compelling reason Marshall suggested, the
Framers did design the power-granting provisions of the Constitution to be, to
some extent, organic. The Framers likely expected that posterity, in the sense
of later generations acting through the processes of electorally accountable
policymaking, would give shape to certain aspects of the constitutional order
that were, in 1789, somewhat indeterminate. 90 If one accepts such premises-
and I see no reason not to-it is appropriate, for example, for the Supreme
Court to defer to Congress' impliedly expansive reading of the commerce
clause9' by sustaining modem federal regulatory legislation. 92 But, again, to
sustain is one thing, to strike down quite another. There is no historical
evidence that the Framers expected, much less intended, that the Supreme
Court would frustrate electorally accountable policymaking by rendering its
own expansive readings of the power-limiting provisions of the Constitution.
Nor can the organic nature of the power-granting provisions explain such a
practice. To invoke, in support of such a practice, and therefore in opposition
to interpretivism, the organic nature of those provisions, or the intentions of
the Framers, or Marshall's statements in McCulloch, is to betray a funda-
mental confusion of one mode of judicial activity-invalidation of challenged
policy choices on the basis of expansive judicial readings of power-limiting
provisions-with a palpably different mode-validation of challenged policy
choices on the basis of judicial deference to impliedly expansive nonjudicial
(electorally accountable) readings of power-granting provisions.93 And it is an
evasive confusion, one that begs a central question:
It is no answer to argue... "we cannot have our government run as if it were
stuck in the end of the eighteenth century when we are in the middle of the
88. Marshall was referring to the necessary and proper clause, which provides: "The Congress shall have
power ... to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.- U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). See Marshall, A Friend to the Constitution,. in JOHN MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 185 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
90. Of course, the Framers also expected that posterity would, from time to time, amend the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST., art. V.
91. The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have power... to regulate commerce... among
the several states.- U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 , cl. 3.
92. Which, with one exception, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is precisely what
the modem Court has done.
93. Remarkably, the confusion is quite common. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 103-10 (1962).
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twentieth," because. . . the real issue is who is to make the policy choices in the
twentieth century: judges or the combination of legislature and electorate that
makes constitutional amendments. 4
II.
In the remainder of this Article, I shall examine the implication of inter-
pretivism-of the claim that all noninterpretive review is illegitimate-for two
of the most important areas of constitutional doctrine: freedom of expression
and equal protection. I shall also examine a prominent and, in my view,
unsuccessful attempt to defend, against interpretivism, the noninterpretive
review the Supreme Court has exercised in formulating the bulk of constitu-
tional doctrine regarding both freedom of expression and equal protection.
A.
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 95 It was intended as a limitation only on action of the
federal government, 96 but since 1925, 97 the Supreme Court has reviewed
action of state governments under the first amendment on the theory that first
amendment norms were made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment, which was intended as a constraint on state action. 93 That
theory, however, is wrong. The history of the fourteenth amendment is not
something from which we can escape-although some constitutional theo-
rists, in the spirit of Joyce's Stephen Dedalus, persist in trying. 99 The Framers
of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to make applicable to the states
the first amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights. Recent,
94. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 315 (1977). For an example of the sort of question-begging
answer Berger protests, see L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 143 (1967): "'Tjhe dead
hand of the past need not and should not be binding .... " See also Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 229 n.96 (1980): "[T]here is no justification for binding the
present to the compromises of another age." Paul Brest writes that "the fact that a [constitutional] provision
was drafted by an unrepresentative and self-interested portion of the adopters' society weakens its moral claim
on a different society one or two hundred years later." Id. at 230. But that fact, even if it justifies ignoring certain
value judgments constitutionalized by the Framers two hundred years ago, does not justify judicial action
striking down challenged governmental policy choices in the name of value judgments not constitutionalized by
the Framers.
95. The amendment also provides that Congress shall make no law "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
96. No one disputes the fact that the first amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights were not intended as
limitations on state governments. See Barron v. Baltimore. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See generally L. LEVY.
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64-79 (1972).
97. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
98. See, e.g., ELY. supra note 7, at 24-28.




exhaustive research confirms that proposition, which was already firmly
established by Charles Fairman and others.
The original understanding of section one of the fourteenth amendment
was that it forbade any state to discriminate against any of its residents on the
basis of race with respect to certain sorts of rights (and the protection of those
rights)-those pertaining to physical security, freedom of movement, and
capacity to contract and own property. Raoul Berger's conclusion to that
effect is quite sound.' In particular, his finding that the fourteenth amend-
ment was not intended to make the Bill of Rights, including the first amend-
ment,'0' applicable to the states-which is confirmatory of earlier findings to
100. For examples of commentary generally accepting Berger's history-though not necessarily the con-
stitutional theory Berger marries to that history-see Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice at Any
Cost" '?-The Judicial Role Revisited: Reflections on Government By Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 467 (1979); Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitu-
tional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 603 (1978); Beloff, Book Review, London Times Higher Educ. Supp., April 7, 1978, at II, col. 1;
Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907; Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J., November 25, 1977, at 4, col.
4; Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801 (1978); Kommers, Book Review, REV. OF POL. 409, 413 (July,
1978); Lynch, Book Review, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1091-93 (1978); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 579, 581 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978). See also Bridwell, The Scope of
Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority Rule, 31 S. CAR. L. REV. 617 (1980). For generally
effective rebuttals by Berger to criticisms of his history, see Berger, "Government By Judiciary": Judge
Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.L. REV. 783 (1979) (responding to Gibbons, Book Review, 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 839 (1978)); Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: An Ongoing Debate, 6 HAST. CONST.
L.Q. 527 (1979) (responding to various articles in a Symposium, 6 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 403 (1979)); Berger,
Government By Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979) (responding to Ely, Constitu-
tional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978)); Berger, The Scope of Judicial
Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 341 (1979)(responding to Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J.
1752 (1978)); Berger, Government by Judiciary: Some Countercriticism, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1136-45 (1978)
(responding to Clark, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 947 (1978)). Berger's rebuttals to criticisms of his
constitutional theory are much less effective in my view.
Aviam Soifer, in his Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique ofRaoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1979), claims that Berger's "Government by Judiciary contains very poor history.... [T]he history [Berger]
offers ... is misleading and frequently internally inconsistent in the most crucial areas." Id. at 654, 655.
However, Soifer does "not dispute Berger's assertion that the fourteenth amendment simply constitutionalized
the guarantee of civil rights contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Id. at 657. Rather, Soifer argued that,
"[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that the fourteenth amendment merely constitutionalized the statutory
rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Berger is simply wrong about how broad those rights were."
Id. at 658. Yet nowhere in his entire essay does Soifer take issue with Berger's central claims that neither the
1866 Act nor the fourteenth amendment were intended to affect suffrage or segregation.
Berger is probably correct in arguing that suffrage was not deemed a civil right in 1866. After all,
women were citizens but they did not have the vote. The continued separation of the races in the
schools of the District of Columbia and in a few Northern states indicates that a majority of the 39th
Congress, if they gave any thought to it at all, might not then have included a right to integrated
schooling in their definition of civil rights.
Id. at 705. What, then, is Soifer's critique of Berger? Soifer says essentially only this: "Mhe members of the
39th Congress did not carefully limit and specify the civil rights with which they were concerned, nor did they
indicate that they hoped to set those rights in 1866, as in Devonian amber." Id. Soifer's critique of Berger's
history is, in the end, not all that consequential. Moreover, nowhere does Soifer take issue with the conclusion
that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
101. See Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 346-47
(1979):
Striking confirmation [that the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights] is
furnished by an amendment proposed by James Blaine in 1875, in a Congress which included twenty-
three members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, among them Blaine. Prior thereto he had written a letter
published by the New York Times indicating that the fourteenth amendment did not forbid states from
establishing official churches or maintaining sectarian schools. Consequently he proposed that "No
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the same effect by such eminent historians as Charles Fairman' 2 and, more
recently, Leonard Levy °3-is amply documented' °4 and widely accepted. 0 5
Given the fact that the Framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to
make the limitations on federal action specified by the Bill of Rights also
state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of."
Not one of the several Representatives and Senators who spoke on the proposal even suggested
that its provisions were implicit in the [fourteenth] amendment ratified just seven years
earlier.... Remarks of Randolph, Christaincy, Kernan, White, Bogy, Eaton and Morton give confir-
mation to the belief that none of the legislators in 1875 thought the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porated the religious provisions of the First.
To cling to the Bingham-Howard remarks on which Justice Black relied for his incorporation
doctrine [see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)] is obstinately to
ignore the facts showing they were not generally shared and were untenable.
Quoting J. MCCLELLAN, JUSTICE STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 154 (1971); F. O'BRIEN,
JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116 (1958).
102. See VI C. FAIRMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1292-93 n.275 (1971); Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949). See also Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendnent Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Judicial
Interpretation. 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
103. See L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 70 (1972) (agreeing
with Fairman that "there is very little evidence either that [the] framers [of the fourteenth amendment] intended
[that the amendment make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states] or that the country understood that
intention"). Cf. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 686, 689-90 (1978):
The historian Leonard Levy, in an assessment of the "incorporation" debate between Justice Black
and Charles Fairman, argued that:
Though the palm must be awarded to Fairman as the better historian by far .... Fairman's
findings were basically negative. He did not disprove that the Fourteenth [Amendment]
incorporated the Bill of Rights; he proved, rather, that there is very little evidence either that
its framers intended that result or that the country understood that intention. Fairman himself
criticized Black for relying too heavily on negative evidence, yet he followed Black's example
by drawing conclusions from silence or the absence of proof positive. In short, the historical
record .. is inconclusive.
Berger's response to Levy's analysis is, in my view. persuasive:
The proposition that "the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights'" consti-
tutes an invasion of rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. an invasion of
such magnitude as to demand proof that such was the framers' intention. Levy would shift the
burden of proof and require Black's critics to prove the negative [that the framers did not
intend the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Bill of Rights] before he proved the
intention to incorporate.
Quoting L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 70 (1972), in R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 137 n.17 (1977). Berger's response to Levy constitutes an adequate
response to John Ely as well. See ELY, supra note 7, at 25-28 & 195 n.56.
104. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-56 (1977). See also Berger, Government by
Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation", 54 IND L.J. 277, 299-302 (1979); note 100 supra.
105. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962) (Charles Fairman "conclusively
disproved [Justice] Black's contention, [in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (dissenting)] that
the fourteenth amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, at least, such is the
weight of opinion among disinterested observers"); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1975) (referring to Justice Black's "flimsy historical evidence" in Adamson); Alfange, On
Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Themy of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 5 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 603, 607 (1978). ("it is all but certain that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights"); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 9-10 (1978-79) ("nothing
in the history of the fourteenth amendment suggests that [it was intended to make the religion clauses of the first
amendment applicable to the states]. The transmogrification occurred solely at the whim of the Court. An
attempt to pass a constitutional amendment providing for the application of the religion clauses to the states, the
Blaine Amendment, failed in 1876, eight years after effectuation of the fourteenth amendment."); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224 (1980) (even a "moderate"
interpretivist "would have serious difficulties justifying... the incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment"). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 n.9 (1963) (Harlan, J.,joined
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applicable to state action, enforcement of the first amendment by the Court
against the states is not interpretive review and is legitimate only if nonin-
terpretive review of state action under first amendment norms can be justi-
fied.
Put aside for the moment the fact that the Framers of the fourteenth
amendment did not intend to make the first amendment applicable to the
states; assume, for the sake of argument, that they did indeed intend the first
amendment to constrain state action in the same way it was intended to
constrain federal action and that consequently there is no need to distinguish
between state and federal action for purposes of the first amendment. Even
so, very little constitutional doctrine regarding freedom of expression
fashioned in this century'06 could be understood as the product of interpretive
review, because very little of that doctrine reflects any value judgment con-
cerning freedom of expression constitutionalized by the Framers of the first
amendment. Although we cannot say with certainty precisely what effect the
Framers of the Bill of Rights intended the first amendment to have with
respect to freedom of expression, we can say that at most they intended it to
prohibit any system of prior restraint 10 7 and to modify the common law of
seditious libel'08 by making truth a defense and by permitting the case to be
tried to a jury.' 9 In his masterful study of the original understanding of the
by Stewart, J., dissenting). But see Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to
Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980). Berger's reply to Curtis will be forthcoming in the Ohio
State Law Journal.
106. No first amendment doctrine of consequence was fashioned before this century. See generally I N.
DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 14-39 (4th ed. 1976).
107. A system of prior restraint consists of administrative censorship under which nothing can be printed
until a license is first issued by the appropriate functionary. Such a system "had expired in England in 1695, and
in the colonies by 1725. " Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (194 1). Apparently a system of
prior restraint flourishes in the Soviet Union. See Lifshitz-Losev, What It Means to be Censored, THE NEW
YORK REVIEW, June 29, 1978, at 43-50.
108. "Seditious libel" has been defined as "the intentional publication, without lawful excuse orjustifica-
tion, of written blame of any public man, or of the law, or of any institution established by law." Z. CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1941). According to Chafee, "[t]here was no need to prove any
intention on the part of the defendant to produce disaffection or excite an insurrection. It was enough if he
intended to publish the blame, because it was unlawful of him merely to find fault with his masters and betters."
Id. See also L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 10 (1960):
[Seditious libel] can be defined in a quite elaborate and technical manner in order to take into account
the malicious or criminal intent of the accused, the bad tendency of his remarks, and their truth or
falsity. But the crime has never been satisfactorily defined, the necessary result of its inherent vague-
ness, Seditious libel has always been an accordion-like concept. Judged by actual prosecutions, the
crime consisted of criticizing the government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, symbols, conduct,
policies, and so on. In effect, any comment about the government which could be construed to have
the bad tendency of lowering it in the public's esteem or of disturbing the peace was seditious libel,
subjecting the speaker or writer to criminal prosecution.
109. With respect to the possibility that the first amendment was intended to prohibit any system of prior
restraint--or, more accurately, to prohibit Congress from instituting such a system-see Levy, Liberty of the
Press from Zenger to Jefferson, in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY 115, 136 (1972). But see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1941):
If we apply Coke's test of statutory construction, and consider what mischief in the existing law
the framers of the First Amendment wished to remedy by a new safeguard, we can be sure it was not
the [system of prior restraint]. This had expired in England in 1695, and in the colonies by 1725. They
knew from books that it destroyed liberty of the press; and if they ever thought of its revival as within
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first amendment, Leonard Levy has written that "the generation which
adopted the Constitution and Bill of Rights did not believe in a broad scope for
freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics .... [L]ibertarian
theory from the time of Milton to the ratification of the First Amendment
substantially accepted the right of the state to suppress seditious libel."" 0
the range of practical possibilities, they must have regarded it as clearly prohibited by the First
Amendment. But there was no need to go to all the trouble of pushing through a constitutional
amendment just to settle an issue that had been dead for decades. What the framers did have plenty of
reason to fear was an entirely different danger to political writers and speakers [-namely, prosecution
for seditious libel].
With respect to the possibility that the first amendment was intended to modify the common law of
seditious libel in the respects indicated, see L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION ix (1960):
Take ... the two major libertarian propositions of the later eghteenth century, that truth is a defense
against a charge of criminal libel, and that the jury should have the power of deciding the questions that
judges reserved to themselves: whether the defendant's intent was malicious and whether his words
had the seditious tendency alleged. That these libertarian propositions were "in the air" is beyond
doubt. But most of the scraps of evidence that can be gathered on the subject tend to show that it was
not the intention in America to modify the common law by incorporating these propositions within the
meaning of free-press guarantees. Yet I am certain that if the American people at any time between the
Zenger case and ratification of the First Amendment would have held a referendum, they would have
overwhelmingly cast their ballots in favor of the two propositions. Working with the "evidence,"
however, leads to the conclusion that this certainty on my part is utterly unprovable; according to the
,evidence, the issue was, at best, unsettled.
It is provable, however--and Levy's book, id., supplies the proof:
Freedom of speech and press ... was not understood to include a right to broadcast sedition by
words. The security of the state against libelous advocacy or attack was always regarded as outweigh-
ing any social interest in open expression, at least through the period of the adoption of the First
Amendment. The thought and experience of a lifetime, indeed the taught traditions of law and politics
extending back many generations, supplied an a priori belief that freedom of political discourse,
however broadly conceived, stopped short of seditious libel.
Id. at 237. See also note 110 and accompanying text infra.
In a later piece, Levy has written that the injunction of the first amendment--"Congress shall make no
law..."--"was intended to prohibit any Congressional regulation of the press, whether by means of a licensing
act. a tax act, or a sedition act. The framers meant Congress to be totally without power to enact legislation
regarding the press." Levy, Liberty of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, in L. LEVY. JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS
ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 115, 136 (1972). As Levy explains:
We have noted that a constitutional guarantee of a free press did not per se preclude a sedition act. but
the prohibition on Congress did, although it left the federal courts free to try [common lawl cases of
seditious libel. It ... appears that the prohibition on Congress was motivated far less by a desire to
give immunity to political expression than by a solicitude for states' rights and the federal principle.
The primary purpose of the First Amendment was to reserve to the states an exclusive authority, as far
as legislation was concerned, in the field of speech and press.
Id. at 137-38. But surely Levy does not mean to suggest-at any rate it beggars belief to suggest-that in the first
amendment the Framers constitutionalized a value judgment that would preclude Congress from outlawing, for
example, any publication calling for the assassination of a federal official, or disclosing troop movements in time
of war. Therefore, it seems safest to conclude that at most the first amendment was intended to prohibit
Congress from instituting any system of prior restraint and perhaps from discriminating against the press as
press (as, for example, by levying a special tax on the press), and to require Congress, if it later chose to make
seditious libel a crime, to make truth a defense and to permit the case to be tried to ajury. With respect to the
latter point, the Sedition Act, I STAT. 596 (July 14. 1798). which is virtually contemporaneous with the first
amendment, tends to bear me out. In section three of the Act, Congress provided:
[Ihf any person shall be prosecuted under this act. for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it
shall be lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give evidence in his defence, the truth
of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the cause, shall
have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
The Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801, but prior to that time its constitutional validity "was sustained by
the lower federal courts and by three Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit." I N. DORSEN et al., EIER-
SON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (4th ed. 1976).
110. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION vii (1960).
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Given the narrowness of the original understanding, we must conclude
that even if the first amendment was intended (by the Framers of the four-
teenth amendment) to constrain state and federal action in the same way, very
little if any modem constitutional doctrine regarding freedom of expres-
sion-for example, the protection extended subversive advocacy,"' de-
famatory utterances," 2 vulgar"3 and pornographic expression," 14 commercial
speech,'15 and campaign expenditures' 16-could be defended as the product of
interpretive review. Such doctrine goes far beyond any value judgment con-
stitutionalized by the Framers of the first amendment. Hence, most constitu-
tional doctrine regarding freedom of expression is not legitimate unless non-
interpretive review of state and federal action under free-speech and free-
press norms-which alone explains most such doctrine-can be justified.
That proposition is true with respect to state action even if the first amend-
ment was intended to constrain state and federal action in the same way; it is
doubly true when we retrieve the fact, put aside a moment ago, that the
Framers of the fourteenth amendment plainly did not intend to make the first
amendment applicable to the states at all. (I could make similar claims about
constitutional doctrine regarding freedom of religion. 117)
Therefore, one cannot be an interpretivist-a consistent interpretivist, at
any rate-and at the same time approve the Court imposing any first amend-
ment limitations on state action (or imposing most of the limitations it has
applied to federal action). Raoul Berger is a consistent interpretivist. Oppos-
ing judicial review of state action under free-speech and free-press norms, he
writes:
One may agree with Justice Cardozo that free speech is "the matrix, the indis-
pensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom," but the fact remains
that the one time the American people had the opportunity to express themselves
on whether free speech was "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental" was in the First Congress, which drafted
the Bill of Rights in response to popular demand. There they voted down inter-
ference with State control." 8
Ill. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1%9)(government may not "'forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where ;uch advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
112. See, e.g.. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (discussing constitutional privileges
against liability for defamation of public and private figures).
113. See, e.g.. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (government may not punish act of wearing, in
public, jacket with "'Fuck the Draft- emblazoned on back).
114. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (discussing protection afforded pornographic expres-
sion).
115. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)(discuss-
ing protection afforded commercial speech).
116. See. e.g.. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (discussing protection afforded campaign expendi-
tures).
117. See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Supreme Court. 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978-79).
118. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 272 (1977), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325, 327 (1937)(Cardozo, J.). See note 122 infra.
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William Rehnquist, on the other hand, is not a consistent interpretivist to the
extent he supports judicial review of state action under free-speech and free-
press norms. But then, perhaps it is too much to expect a sitting Supreme
Court Justice to tilt quixotically at such a firmly established and, as a practical
matter, invulnerable practice." 9
What about our exemplary interpretivist, Robert Bork? Bork explains his
support for judicial review of state action under free-speech and free-press
norms-and for judicial review of federal action under free-speech and free-
press norms not constitutionalized by the Framers' 20-in the following
fashion:
[T]he entire structure of the Constitution creates a representative democracy, a
form of government that would be meaningless without freedom to discuss govern-
ment and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred
even if there were no first amendment. [The Framers] wrote a Constitution provid-
ing for representative democracy, a form of government that is meaningless with-
out open and vigorous debate about officials and their policies.' 2 '
Whatever the merits of his claim that "representative democracy" re-
quires "open and vigorous debate about officials and their policies"-a claim
I am not inclined to dispute-Bork's explanation does not mitigate the incon-
sistency between his interpretivist constitutional theory and his support for
judicial review of state and federal action under free-speech and free-press
norms never constitutionalized by the Framers. Recall the essential argument
of interpretivism-that all noninterpretive review is illegitimate, that the
Court may enforce against electorally accountable policymakers only norms
constitutionalized by the Framers. Bork tries to avoid inconsistency by as-
serting that the Framers, in the Constitution, established a certain form of
government and that that form of government requires constitutional protec-
tion for political speech beyond the limited protection against federal action
specifically authorized by the Framers of the first amendment. He asserts, in
effect, that freedom of political speech is a value judgment implicitly constitu-
tionalized by the Framers, in that it is a value judgment implicit in the form of
government they established.
The fatal problem with Bork's explanation is that the Framers did not
119. Then too, perhaps Justice Rehnquist subscribes to Robert Bork's attempt to explain away the incon-
sistency between interpretivism and support for judicial review of state action under free-speech and free-press
norms. See text accompanying notes 120-28 infra.
Henry Monaghan has suggested, though I am not persuaded, that a Justice ought not to tilt at firmly
established constitutional practice. "I do not think that an individual appointed to the Court could responsibly
base his vote, in relevant cases, on the theory that only the national government is bound to respect free
expression .... History has its claims, at least where settled expectations of the body politic have clustered
around constitutional doctrine." Monaghan, Taking Sttpreine Court Opinions SeriouslY., 39 MD. L. REV. I, 7
(1979).
120. Bork accepts Levy's "demonstration" in LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) that at best the Framers of
the first amendment intended it to have an exceedingly narrow scope. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
121. Id. at 23, 26.
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establish a government in the abstract, called "representative democracy,"
that requires constitutional, and therefore judicial, protection for political
speech beyond the protection they specifically authorized. Rather, they
adopted a Constitution that provided, in the first amendment, for limited
protection against federal action abridging freedom of expression; moreover,
they specifically rejected a proposal under which state action abridging free-
dom of expression would have been subject to federal constitutional limita-
tions '2 Consequently, the Constitution the Framers adopted (the value judg-
ments they constitutionalized) is far from congenial to Bork's abstract notion
of "representative democracy"; the Framers did not establish a representa-
tive democracy in anything like Bork's sense.' 2 Recall, in that regard, Levy's
documented conclusion, which Bork has accepted, 2 4 that "the generation
which adopted the Constitution and Bill of Rights did not believe in a broad
scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics."'21
In extending constitutional protection for political speech (or speech of
any other sort) beyond the limited protection, against federal action, author-
ized by the Framers, the Supreme Court is not engaging in interpretive re-
view; it is not simply enforcing a value judgment constitutionalized, implic-
itly or otherwise, by the Framers. Instead, it is making and enforcing value
judgments of its own-judgments about what sorts of speech ought to be
protected, and, at least inferentially, about what sort of government we ought
122. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134-35 n.4 (1977):
It has been little noticed that, as Egbert Benson, speaking with reference to freedom of speech and
press, said, all the Committee of Eleven to whom the amendments had been referred "meant to
provide against was their being infringed by the [federal] Government." I Annals of Congress 732.
Madison urged that "the State governments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against." Id. 441. But his
attempt failed. Charles Warren, "The New 'Liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 Har'. L.
Rev. 431, 433-35 (1926).... The view that prevailed was that of Thomas Tucker: "It will be much
better, I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to interfere with them more
than we already do."
See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922) (The Constitution "imposes upon the States no
obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction ... the right of free speech ....").
123. Indeed, the Framers established a government whose principal constituency were propertied white
males, many of whom were slaveholders. Some "representative democracy" that!
Note that article IV, § 4 of the Constitution-which provides in relevant part that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government"--does not lend support to Bork's
argument, as Bork himself would seem to acknowledge. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
nient Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1. 19 (1971): "[James] Madison's writing on the republican form of government
specified by the guarantee clause suggests that representative democracy may take many forms, so long as the
forms do not become 'aristocratic or monarchical."' Quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (Obviously the
guarantee clause cannot explain judicial review of federal action under free-speech and free-press norms never
constitutionalized by the Framers.).
124. See note 120 supra.
125. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION vii (1960) (emphasis added). Note that the presence in state
constitutions of provisions corresponding to the first amendment does nothing to explain judicial review of state
action by Jederal courts under Jederal free-speech and free-press norms. If anything, the existence of such
provisions in the late eighteenth century or the nineteenth century suggests that freedom of expression, as a
constraint on state action, is properly the business of state courts enforcing state constitutions, not federal
courts enforcing the federal Constitution.
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to have. In short, the Court is engaging in noninterpretive review,'2 6 albeit
noninterpretive review aimed more at defining the processes of governmental
policymaking than at evaluating particular policy choices generated by those
processes.
I can readily understand why Professor Bork is anxious to support consti-
tutional protection for political speech beyond the exceedingly limited pro-
tection established by the Framers. But the notion that the Supreme Court-
in addition to the representatives of the people acting through the processes of
constitutional amendment-may provide that protection is fundamentally at
odds with his constitutional theory. It is possible, I believe, to justify non-
interpretive review of governmental action under free-speech and free-press
norms,' 27 but Bork, given his commitment to interpretivism and, so, his rejec-
tion of all noninterpretive judicial review, doesn't have that "out." Bork can't
have his theory and ignore it too-ignore its implications. Indeed, one reason
for rejecting interpretivist constitutional theory and trying to develop an
alternative theory that accepts at least some noninterpretive review is pre-
cisely that the implications of interpretivism are so severe. Interpretivism
necessitates the conclusion, given the original understandings of the first and
fourteenth amendments, that most "first amendment" doctrine-much of
which is revered 128 even by those quick to criticize most other constitutional
doctrines wrought by the modern Court-is the tainted fruit of noninterpre-
tive review and thus illegitimate.
Even more painfully perhaps, interpretivism requires the conclusion, as
we're about to see, that Brown v. Board of Education, 29 the 1954 case in
which a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that racially segregated public
schooling contravenes the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion of the laws-the case that, in Charles Black's words, "opened our era of
judicial activity" 130 -is illegitimate too. Let's turn to the matter of interpre-
tivism and equal protection.
With respect to the seminal case of Brown and its progeny in particular,
the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment clearly discloses that the
Framers did not mean for the amendment to have any effect on segregated
public schooling or on segregation generally. '' To argue, as I have elsewhere,
126. That the Court's review is noninterpretive rather than interpretive in most freedom of expression
cases should not be surprising. After all, *'one can better protect . the integrity of democratic processes by
protecting them than by guessing how other people meant to govern a different society a hundred or more years
ago." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 50 B.U.L. REV. 204, 208 (1980).
127. Indeed, I believe it is possible to justify noninterpretive review in human rights cases generally. At
least, I try to do so in the work of which this Article is a part.
128. But not all of it, least of all, perhaps, that protecting pornography. see, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28-30 (1971), and commercial speech, see, e.g., Jackson &
Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. C. BLACK, DECISIONS ACCORDING TO LAW 7 (1979).
131. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977). Even Berger's critics seem not to
dispute this point. See, e.g., Soifer, Protecting CivilRights:A Critique ofRaoul Berger's Historv, 54 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 651, 705 (1979).
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that the equal protection clause can fairly be taken to radiate the principle of
the moral irrelevance of racei32 is not to deny that to take it so is to read into
the fourteenth amendment a principle that, for whatever reasons, the Framers
did not constitutionalize. In reading that principle into the amendment the
Court does not enforce a value judgment the Framers made but, instead,
makes and enforces a value judgment of its own. Consider Paul Brest's recent
comments to that effect:
Consider the relationship between the original, understanding of the fourteenth
amendment and current doctrine prohibiting gender-based classifications....
[T]o what extent have [the text or original understanding of the equal protection
clause] guided the evolution of [that] doctrine? The text is wholly open-ended; and
if the [Framers] had any intentions at all about [the] issue, their resolution was
probably contrary to the Court's. At most, the Court can claim guidance from the
general notion of equal treatment reflected in [the equal protection clause]. I use
the word "reflected" advisedly, however, for the equal protection clause does not
establish a principle of equality .... Indeed, because of its indeterminacy, the
clause does not offer much guidance even in resolving particular issues of dis-
crimination based on race. 133
The modem Court, in equal protection cases, has been an active, per-
sistent policymaker. 134 One cannot be a logically consistent interpretivist and
accept equal protection doctrine banning, for example, racial segregation.' 35
Raoul Berger is a consistent interpretivist to the extent he contends that the
Court's seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education was illegitimate.
The Court's decision in Brown was unwarranted, says Berger, because segre-
gated public schooling does not offend equal protection as originally under-
132. See Perry. Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023,
1028-32 (1979). See also Perry. The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J. - (198 1).
133. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 231-32 (1980).
See id. at 231-34.
134. See generally Perry. Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023 (1979).
135. It is tempting to say that one cannot be an interpretivist and accept any equal protection constraints on
Jederal action, because the fourteenth amendment was intended as a constraint only on state action. John Ely
has argued to that effect. ELY, supra note 7, at 32-33. See also Brest, The Misconceived Questjor the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224 (1980). But is it implausible to think that one can be an interpretivist
and at the same time accept application of section one of the fourteenth amendment, as originally understood, to
federal action? The Framers of the fourteenth amendment constitutionalized the judgment that it is wrong to
discriminate on the basis of race with respect to certain sorts of rights. The distinction between action by state
government and action by the federal government would seem to be irrelevant to-to make no sense with
respect to-that judgment. (I do not mean to suggest that the Framers of constitutional provisions are somehow
obligated to constitutionalize only "sensible"--coherent, internally consistent-valuejudgments. But surely we
ought not to presume that a particular value judgment constitutionalized by the Framers is not sensible. True,
the Framers were focused on state action, in narticular the infamous Black Codes. See Perry, Modern Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 ,ULUM. L. srEv. 1023, 1026 n. 15 (1979). But tney hau no
occasion to focus on federal action, since the federal government did not discriminate on the basis of race with
respect to the sorts of rights that concerned the Framers. (Indeed, at that time the federal government had little
to do with those sorts of rights; such rights-regarding "life, liberty, and property" in the narrow original
sense-were almost wholly the states* concern.) The important point is that the value judgment the Framers
constitutionalized-that racial discrimination regarding certain rights is wrong-was at bottom ajudgment about
what government in general should not do, and not simply about what state government should not do. (Of
course one cannot be an interpretivist and accept any equal protection constraints on either federal or state
action beyond those established by the Framers).
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stood, which, for Berger, is the determinative norm. 3 6 For Berger, the
Court's policymaking under equal protection is illegitimate no matter how
sound the substance of the policymaking might be, 137 because in the hands
of the judiciary the policymaking constitutes an usurpation of the legislative
function of determining what value judgments, beyond those constitution-
alized by the Framers, shall inform the activities of the political commun-
ity. 1
38
But Berger stops short of contending that Brown should be overruled:
It would.., be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in the
face of the expectations that the segregation decisions ... have aroused in our
black citizenry--expectations confirmed by every decent instinct. That is more
than the courts should undertake and more, I believe, than the American people
would desire.139
Apparently even Berger can't bring himself to accept all the implications,
some of them obviously quite enormous, of interpretivist constitutional
theory. Berger has sought to defend his failure to call for the overruling of
Brown, in his view a fundamentally illegitimate decision, by asserting that
"[i]t is not a failure of analysis to acknowledge that eggs cannot be un-
scrambled."'' 40 But judicial precedent can be unscrambled-overruled-as
indeed Berger himself emphasizes in his book:
Why should "adherence to precedent" rise above effectuation of the framers'
clearly expressed intention, which expresses the value choices of the sovereign
people, not merely of judicial predecessors?' 4 '
I assert the right to look at the Constitution itself, stripped ofjudicial incrusta-
tions, as the index of the constitutional law and to affirm that the Supreme Court
has no authority to substitute an "unwritten Constitution" for the written Con-
stitution the Founders gave us and the people ratified.'
42
To the extent the implications of a political theory count as a reason for
accepting or rejecting the theory, Berger's seeming failure of nerve with
respect to a basic implication of interpretivism-that Brown and its progeny
ought to be overruled-is instructive.
Robert Bork has suggested that the result in Brown can be salvaged in
terms consistent with his interpretivist premises. We do not know, says Bork,
just what sorts of racial inequality the Framers of the fourteenth amendment
meant to attack. Yet, we cannot permit the Court to function like a policy-
maker and simply pick and choose what sorts of racial inequality shall be
deemed improper and what sorts shall not. Rather, we must constrain the
136. See note 131 supra.
137. Berger of course opposes the result in Brown on constitutional, not moral, grounds.
138. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249-418 (1977).
139. Id. at 412-13.
140. Berger, Letter to the Editor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 11, 1978, at 7.
141. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 281 (1977). Compare Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1979).
142. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 297-98 (1977).
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Court, which cannot be allowed to exercise the discretion of a policymaker,
by insisting that it strike down all racial inequalities, including segregated
public schooling.' 43 The fatal problem with Bork's convenient argument-
convenient in that it spares Bork the embarrassment of acknowledging that his
constitutional theory, interpretivism, and the Court's decision in Brown are
fundamentally at odds-is that, as Berger insists, we do know that the
Framers did not intend to prohibit segregated public schooling.' 4 If one ac-
cepts interpretivist constitutional theory, as Bork, like Berger, does, it fol-
lows, given the fact that the Framers did not mean to prohibit segregated
schooling, that Brown must be deemed illegitimate. Berger's logic is quite
sound in that respect. As Bork himself emphasizes:
The words [of the equal protection clause] are general but surely that would not
permit us to escape the framers' intent if it were clear. If the legislative history
revealed a consensus about segregation in schooling .... I do not see how the
Court could escape the choice revealed and substitute its own, even though the
words are general and conditions have changed.145
The unavoidable problem for Bork and other interpretivists understandably
anxious to avoid condemning Brown and its progeny as illegitimate is that the
legislative history of the fourteenth amendment does reveal a consensus-a
tragic, morally indefensible consensus-about segregation in schooling (and,
indeed, about segregation generally). And so Bork's convenient argument
simply won't work.
It is doubtless true that our reading of the original understandings of
constitutional provisions such as the free speech and free press clauses of the
first amendment and the equal protection clause is not perfectly accurate.
After all, it is impossible to uncover the intentions of each of the many
Framers of a provision-those who drafted the provision and then those in the
state conventions or legislatures who ratified it.' 46 Moreover, historical
inquiry is inevitably subjective; to some extent our vision of the past is ir-
143. Bork, Neutral Principles and Sone First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 14-15 (1971). Bork's
argument is a strange one for an interpretivist to make. If in fact we do not know just what sorts of racial
inequality the Framers of the fourteenth amendment meant to ban, then the proper office for an interpretivist
court is not to pick and choose what sorts of racial inequality shall be banned and what sorts shall not. Nor,
contrary to what Bork argues, is it to ban all racial inequalities. Rather its proper office is to ban only those sorts
of racial inequalities which we do know the Framers meant to ban. In short, a court may not, consistently with
interpretivism. ban any political practice unless it can say that the practice is of the sort the Framers meant to
ban; if it cannot say that, the court must, consistently with interpretivism. sustain the practice. Discretion of the
sort Bork wants to constrain doesn't even enter into the matter.
144. 1 should note, in fairness to Bork, that he was writing some six years before Berger made it painfully
clear that the Framers of the fourteenth amendment did not mean to prohibit segregated public schooling (or
segregation generally).
145. Id. at 13.
146. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-17
(1980). But see Dellinger, School Segregation and Professor Avum's History: A Defense oJ Brown v. Board of
Education. 38 MISS. L.J. 248, 251 n.6 (1967): "[[W]hatever the congressional debates establish should constitute
a rebuttable presumption, since 'it is not unrealistic, in the main, to assume notice of congressional purpose in
the state legislatures."' Quoting Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV
L. REV. 1, 7 (1955).
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remediably colored-distorted-by our vision in the present. 47 But if not
perfectly accurate, our reading is sufficiently accurate-accurate enough to
justify the conclusion that the Court's decisions regarding human rights in
most modem constitutional cases of note, and particularly in most freedom of
expression and equal protection cases, cannot plausibly be explained as
"interpretations" or "applications" of any value judgments constitutional-
ized by the Framers, whatever the precise character of those various value
judgments might be.'4 They can be explained only as products of noninterpre-
tive review. In the same vein, the fact that Berger's reading of the original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment is not free from doubt in every
detail has a very limited significance for present purposes. For it is nonethe-
less true that precious little fourteenth amendment doctrine-including the
notion that various provisions of the Bill of Rights, like the first amendment,
constrain state action by virtue of the fourteenth amendment--can be ex-
plained by reference to the original understanding of the fourteenth amend-
ment, even if the original understanding is somewhat broader than Berger
acknowledges. Henry Monaghan's sound observations about the contempo-
rary debate over the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment are
relevant here:
Even if its architects intended § I [of the fourteenth amendment] to transcend
the [Civil Rights Act of 1866], the question persists of how sweeping a change in
the governmental structure § I authorized. Those who attack [Raoul] Berger fre-
quently slip into a comfortable non sequitur at this point: they assume that if
Berger is in error, § I perforce has a dynamic content. Logically, however, their
demonstration that Berger's list of § 1 rights is too narrow is not proof that it is
proper to measure the content of the fourteenth amendment by other than some
closed set of rights as they were understood in 1868. In other words, their attack
does not dispose of a limited conception of the fourteenth amendment, with the
judge's function being essentially historical-to enter a time machine, return to the
147. See Brest, Tire Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 221-22
(1980).
148. By the "'Framers," I mean, primarily, those persons-sitting in the original Constitutional Convention
or, in the case of amendments to the Constitution, in Congress-who voted to propose the relevant constitu-
tional provision(s) and, secondarily, those persons in the individual state conventions or legislatures who voted
to ratify the provision. The Framers' understanding of a particular provision is what I mean by the "original
understanding" of the provision. Ascertaining the precise contours of the original understanding of any given
provision may be difficult, sometimes even impossible. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 139-45 (1st ed. 1975); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Origital Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-17 (1980); tenBroek, Use by tre United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction. 27 CAL. L. REV. 399, 405-06 (1939). Still, it is usually possible to ascertain the
rough contours of that understanding. And once the rough contours have been ascertained, it is frequently
possible to say: Although we don't know exactly what the Framers thought this provision would accomplish,
there is strong evidence they thought it would not accomplish X; or strong evidence they did not think it would
accomplish X; or no evidence, or wholly inadequate evidence, they thought it would accomplish X. The
historian's ability to ascertain the rough contours of the original understanding of the various constitutional
provisions discussed or mentioned in this work is sufficient for purposes of the claims about the original
understanding on which I rely. Cf. ELY, supra note 7 at 16: "I [am not] endorsing for an instant the nihilist view
that it is impossible ever responsibly to infer from a past act and its surrounding circumstances the intentions of
those who performed it."
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year 1868, and scrutinize "contemporary" sources to determine the extent to
which the assertedly expansive language of § I would prohibit only what fell
within those objectives, however conceptualized, and "their twentieth century
counterparts." 149
B.
Earlier we considered-and dismissed-a number of anti-interpretivist
claims. This is an appropriate point at which to consider another one, which,
like the claims discussed earlier, is fundamentally flawed. In the preceding sev-
eral pages, I have sought to explain why an interpretivist cannot accept most
modem constitutional doctrine regarding freedom of expression and equal
protection. The reason, in brief, is that the Framers' intentions with respect to
the first and fourteenth amendments-which intentions, for the interpretivist,
are determinative-were extremely limited. Some commentators contend that
interpretivists conceive of the original understanding of many important con-
stitutional provisions too narrowly. For example, Ronald Dworkin has argued
that the Framers of the equal protection clause did not mean to constitutional-
ize their particular "conception" of equality, which happened to be quite
narrow, but rather the "concept" of equality, which is quite broad, 5 and that
they intended posterity to honor the concept of equality by abiding its own
conception of equality, which might be broader than the Framers'."'5 The sort
of claim Dworkin makes is really quite common.
[Dworkin employs] a strategy that, in one or another form, is common to all efforts
to derive from the Constitution principles relevant to a world that could not have
149. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (1978).
150. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1975):
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly. I no doubt have in
mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my "meaning" was
limited to these examples, for two reasons. First, I would expect my children to apply my instruction to
situations I had not and could not have thought about. Second. I stand ready to admit that some
particular act I had thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice versa, if one of my children
is able to convince me of that later; in that case I should want to say that my instructions covered the
case he cited, not that I had changed my instructions. I might say that I meant the family to be guided
by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness that I might have had in mind.
(Emphasis in original). See also Mauzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029. 1037 (1977):
The object of the [concept-conception] distinction is to justify the claim that the core meaning of the
Constitution remains unchanged even when judges diverge from the specific content that the framers
would have found there. To appeal to a conception is to appeal to a specific understanding or account
of what the words one is using mean. To appeal to a concept is to invite rational discussion and
argument about what words used to convey some general idea mean. Concepts are not tied to the
author's situation and intention in the way that conceptions are. Broad phrases such as "cruel and
unusual punishment," "freedom of speech," "due process," and "equal protection" tend to be vague
and abstract. While Dworkin is apparently not committed to thinking of the concepts denoted by these
phrases as utterly lacking in content, their content is not usually specific enough to decide troubling
cases involving issues such as capital punishment. They are "contested" concepts; their proper
content is always disputable. Even though people may agree on some paradigm cases of what is and is
not cruel and unusual punishment, theboundaries of this concept are always open to dispute.
151. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1975).
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been anticipated when the document was adopted. He reads the language of the
Constitution at a very high level of abstraction, in effect as a license to interpret its
provisions as the embodiment of the evolving moral conceptions of successive
generations. 152
There is a fatal problem with this sort of claim. 53 Evidence supporting
the proposition that the Framers of constitutional provisions such as the free
speech, free press, and equal protection clauses intended to constitutionalize
broad "concepts" rather than particular "conceptions" is wholly lacking.
Significantly, Dworkin offers absolutely no evidence whatsoever in support of
the proposition.154 Moreover, the proposition is implausible. As Henry
Monaghan has written:
Excessive generalization as to "intent" seems at war with any belief that a con-
stitutional amendment is a conscious alteration of the frame of government whose
major import should be reasonably apparent to those who gave it life .... I am
unable to believe that in light of the then prevailing concepts of representative
democracy, the framers... of § 1 [of the fourteenth amendment] intended the
courts... to weave the tapestry of federally protected rights against state govern-
ment.155
On the other side, the evidence is compelling that the Framers of the first and
fourteenth amendments thought they were constitutionalizing-and therefore
were constitutionalizing-particular and, by contemporary lights, narrow
value judgments about certain (sorts of) political practices.
In claiming, inaccurately, that interpretivists conceive of the original
understanding of many provisions too narrowly, proponents of the concept-
conception claim and of similar claims concede, implicitly if not explicitly, the
interpretivist's premise that the original understanding of a constitutional
provision is determinative. Such claims serve as little more than a device for
avoiding the truly difficult question, which is whether the original understand-
ings of important power-limiting provisions like the first and fourteenth
amendments-the plainly narrow original understandings-ought, as a matter
of constitutional theory, to be deemed determinative. 56 Constitutional theo-
rists would stay closer to that crucial question, which, after all, is the heart of
the matter, if they would bear in mind that power-limiting constitutional pro-
visions-as opposed to power-granting ones 11-typically represent and em-
152. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1168 (1977).
153. For a (typical) variation on the sort of claim Dworkin makes, see Bennett, "Mere- Rationality in
Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1090-91 (1979).
154. Professors Munzer and Nickel are quite properly critical of Dworkin in that regard. See Munzer &
Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1040-41 (1977). For
further criticism of reliance on the concept-conception distinction in constitutional theory, see Saphire, Profes-
sor Richards' Unwritten Constitution of Human Rights: Some Preliminary Observations. 4 U. DAY. L. REV.
305 (1979).
155. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 128-29 (1978). See
also Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Ahvays Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1040
(1977). See also note 158 infra.
156. See also Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1029, 1041 (1977).
157. See text accompanying notes 80-94 supra.
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body, as Monaghan's comments suggest, discrete, determinate value judg-
ments (if not always easily discoverable at this late date) about what particular
sorts of political practices government ought to forswear.
I want to take a moment at this point to set forth the various possible
relationships between the original understanding of any power-limiting consti-
tutional provision and any present-day political practice claimed to violate the
provision. By so doing I hope to make clear that, contrary to the sort of
anti-interpretivist claim Dworkin and others have made, a judicial decision
striking down in the name of a particular constitutional provision a political
practice that (I) was not present to the minds of the Framers of the provision
and (2) is not analogous to any practice that was present to their minds,
cannot plausibly be understood as a mere "interpretation" or "application"
of the provision in question. (Dworkin's concept-conception claim, of course,
is simply a variation on the interpretation/application theme.) Let the equal
protection clause be the power-limiting provision, and let P stand for the
present-day political practice. If the Framers of the equal protection clause
did not have occasion to contemplate P-i.e., if P was not present to their
minds, as it could not have been if P did not exist at all or in anything like its
present form' 5 -they could not have intended that the clause prohibit P.
They might have intended that the clause serve as an "open-ended" provi-
sion, leaving for resolution in the future the issue whether the clause should
be deemed to prohibit any given political practice not forbidden or even
foreseen by them. But it is as clear as such things can be that the important
power-limiting provisions, and in particular the equal protection clause, were
not intended to serve as open-ended norms." 9
If the Framers did contemplate P-and note that if P was not foreseen by
the Framers but is simply a modern analogue of a practice they did contem-
plate, different in no constitutionally significant respect from the contem-
plated practice, it is as ifthey contemplated P6---either they intended that the
clause prohibit P or they did not. If they did not, either they left for resolution in
the future the issue whether the clause should be deemed to prohibit P or
they intended that the clause not prohibit P. But, again, there is no evidence
that the Framers of important power-limiting provisions intended them to
serve as open-ended norms. In particular, ifP is segregated public schooling,
the conclusion is inescapable that the Framers intended that the equal protec-
158. Or with anything like its present significance. Cf. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 220-21 (1980) (suggesting that in the pervasively Christian American
society of the late 18th century, in which belief in an afterlife was the norm, the death penalty could not have had
anything like the significance it has today).
159. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 99-116 (1977). See also Monaghan, The Constitution
Goes to Harrard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117, 127-28 (1978) (quoted in part in text accompanying note
155 supra); Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87, 91 (1979): -'[N]o satisfactory
evidence exists to show that judicial development ofalex non scripta reflects the purpose of either the drafters
or ratifiers of the eighteenth century Constitution or of the Civil War Amendments."
160. See also Alfange, On Judicial Policymnaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the
*'Original Intent'" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 603, 620 (1979).
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tion clause not prohibit P: segregated public schooling was present to the
minds of the Framers; they did not intend that the clause prohibit it; and no
historical evidence suggests that they meant to leave open the question
whether the clause should be deemed to prohibit the practice.161
This is not to say, however, that in Brown the Court's decision invalidat-
ing segregated public schooling was contraconstitutional 16' A contraconstitu-
tional decision would be one that decreed a result contrary to a state of affairs
that is constitutionally required-or one reached in the exercise of a mode of
judicial review that the Framers intended to foreclose. No one suggests that
the Framers meant to require segregated public schooling. Nor did the
Framers-whether of the original Constitution and Bill of Rights or of the
fourteenth amendment-intend that the Supreme Court invalidate only politi-
cal practices inconsistent with value judgments attributable to the Framers;
no historical materials suggest that any group of Framers ever constitutional-
ized any theory of the proper scope of judicial review, whether narrow, like
interpretivism, or broad.63
Of course, to say that the Court's decision in Brown or in any other
constitutional case was not contraconstitutional is not to justify the decision
(although to say that it was contraconstitutional might be to condemn it 64).
Any effort to justify a decision that, like Brown, cannot be explained as an
application of a value judgment that the Framers constitutionalized must rely
on a theory that holds it proper, at least under some circumstances, for the
Court to engage in noninterpretive review-to invalidate political practices on
the basis of value judgments not constitutionalized by the Framers. Claims
that decisions such as Brown involve merely "interpretation" of the Constitu-
tion and therefore pose no problem of legitimacy must be rejected. Such
decisions are predicated on value judgments not constitutionalized by the
Framers and that is precisely what gives rise to the problem of legitimacy, and
what interpretivists, who contend that electorally accountable policymaking
should not be constrained by any value judgments save those the Framers
constitutionalized, condemn.
161. See generallv R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 99-133 (1977).
162. See note 31 supra.
163. But see Bennett, "'Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1092 (1979): "[T]he intent of some legislators, without whose votes the fourteenth
amendment could not have been passed, may have been to erect the Supreme Court as a body with continuing
authority to put content into the fourteenth amendment's general phrases." That suggestion is wholly specula-
tive; no historical materials lend credence to it. Compare Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 220 (1980): "Perhaps [the Framers of any given constitutional provision
limiting governmental power] wanted to bind the future as closely as possible to their own notions. Perhaps they
intended [the] provision to be interpreted with increasing breadth as time went on. Or-more likely than
not--they] may have had no intentions at all concerning these matters." (Emphasis added).
Concededly, the proposition that the Framers intended the equal protection clause not to prohibit segregated
public schooling is equivalent to the proposition that they intended such schooling not be proscribed in the name
of the particular, narrow value judgment they embodied in the clause. But in Brown the Court avoided acting
contrary to that intent by not relying on the claim that its invalidation of segregated public schooling merely
represented enforcement of the Framers' intentions. Rather, the Court suggested that no one could tell whether
the Framers meant to prohibit segregated public schooling. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954).
164. See note 31 supra.
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In the preceding discussion I make reference to present-day political
practices not foreseen by the Framers but different in no constitutionally
significant respect from practices they did contemplate and mean to ban-
practices that are simply modem analogues of banned practices. A fair ques-
tion, therefore, is: When is a present-day political practice no more than a
modem analogue of a past, constitutionally banned practice? The answer, I
think, is fairly straightforward. A present-day political practice, P', is simply
an analogue of a past, constitutionally banned practice, P, when a person-
one who aspires to logical consistency and moral coherence-who would
endorse the political-moral proposition that P ought to be banned could point
to no difference between P and P' that could count as a principled reason for
failing to endorse the distinct proposition that P' ought to be banned. Obvi-
ously there will be occasional differences of opinion as to whether a given
political practice is simply the analogue of another political practice.' 65 But
that fact-which simply illustrates what no one denies: that even an interpre-
tivist approach to constitutional adjudication can generate debatable
answers-is largely irrelevant, since, again, most political practices banned
by the Supreme Court in human rights cases, including freedom of expression
and equal protection cases, cannot plausibly be characterized as simply
modem analogues of past, constitutionally banned practices.
Relatedly, some constitutional theorists argue that by constitutionalizing
value judgment V, the Framers necessarily constitutionalized VI, the most
attractive general normative principle that explains V, and that V' justifies,
even requires, invalidation of present-day political practices that are not
simply analogues of past, constitutionally banned practices.166 But it is rarely
if ever the case that a single general normative principle is required to explain
a value judgment constitutionalized by the Framers. Any of several different,
competing political-moral visions might dispose one to subscribe to a given
value judgment the Framers constitutionalized.' 67 And constitutional theorists
who contend to the contrary are in truth importing into the Constitution's
power-limiting provisions whatever political-moral philosophy they find most
congenial.
C.
In the remainder of this Article, I want to examine a recent, very promi-
nent attempt, in my view quite unsuccessful, to defend noninterpretive review
in both first amendment and equal protection cases against the challenge of
interpretivism. Many constitutional theorists sympathetic to both first amend-
ment and equal protection doctrine recognize what I have sought to demon-
strate-the impossibility of defending either of those two areas of constitu-
165. See note 80 supra.
166. For a critique ofsuch arguments, see Bayles, Morality and the Constitution, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. REV.
167. See id.
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tional doctrine without resort to a noninterpretivist theory of constitutional
adjudication. But several of those theorists are loathe to go too far, or what
they think is too far, in accepting noninterpretivism, for then they would be
hard put to reject constitutional policymaking with respect to norms other
than freedom of expression or equal protection-in particular they feel they
would be hard put to reject modem "substantive due process," a doctrine
with which they are most uncomfortable.'t3 They therefore attempt to articu-
late a limited noninterpretivist constitutional theory, one that justifies the
particular species of constitutional policymaking they want to salvage from an
interpretivist attack-usually policymaking with respect to the norms of free-
dom of expression, equal protection, and procedural fairness 69-and, at the
same time, that condemns species of policymaking for which they have no
sympathy-in particular policymaking with respect to modem substantive
due process norms.' 70
John Ely's Democracy and Distrust17' represents the principal contempo-
rary effort in that regard. I want to explain why Ely's particular constitutional
theory-his limited noninterpretivist theory-which purports to justify nonin-
terpretive review in both first amendment (i.e., freedom of expression) and
equal protection cases but not in substantive due process cases,'7 does not
succeed in justifying noninterpretive review in either first amendment or
equal protection cases.
The sort of noninterpretive review Ely seeks to justify he labels "partici-
pational," as opposed to the "substantive" review he decries.' 73 Participa-
tional review, according to Ely, is aimed at serving the norm of political
participation-participation by persons in the political process-and it does
this by "clearing the channels of political change on the one hand, and [by]
correcting certain kinds of discrimination against minorities on the other." 174
Those two endeavors are predicated, in Ely's view, on "a coherent theory of
representative government."' 75 Ely's "general theory is one that bounds
[noninterpretive review] by insisting that it can appropriately concern itself
168. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 14-15 (the old, early 20th century substantive due process cases,
"conventionally referred to under the head of Lochner v. Newl" York, [198 U.S. 45 (1905),] one of the earlier
ones, . . .are now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper-for obvious reasons by
interpretivists, for somewhat less obvious ones by noninterpretivists.").
169. See note 244 hifra.
170. Of course, to accept constitutional policymaking by the judiciary with respect to a given norm, like
freedom of expression, is not necessarily to accept every decision and doctrinal development fashioned by the
judiciary in the course of that policymaking. On the other hand, to reject constitutional policymaking with
respect to a given norm is necessarily to reject every decision and doctrinal development fashioned by thejudiciary in the course of that policymaking. Therefore, one who wants to accept even one decision handed
down by the judiciary in the course of policymaking with respect to a given norm must accept judicial policy-
making with respect to that norm. For example, to salvage the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), from an interpretivist attack, one must salvage the judicial policymaking-with
respect to equal protection-that generated the decision.
171. ELY, supra note 7.
172. See id. at 43-72.
173. Id. at 182. See also note 39 supra.
174. ELY, supra note 7, at 74.
175. Id. See also id. at 77 ("a coherent political theory").
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only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the
political choice under attack. "' 76 We can best explore Ely's meaning by con-
sidering his efforts to justify constitutional policymaking with respect to free-
dom of expression and equal protection.
Let's first consider Ely's effort to justify noninterpretive review in first
amendment cases. According to Ely, there is a radical difference between
noninterpretive review in first amendment cases and that in substantive due
process cases: the former consists ofjudicial policymaking aimed at maintain-
ing the processes of democratic government, while the latter consists of judi-
cial policymaking aimed at revising policy choices generated by those proc-
esses.'" The latter sort of noninterpretive review is illegitimate, says Ely,
because it is undemocratic for the judiciary, in constitutional cases, to revise
policy choices generated by the democratic processes (except on the basis of
value judgments constitutionalized by the Framers). 7 8 But the former sort is
not illegitimate; first amendment rights, whether or not constitutionalized by
the Framers, "must nonetheless be protected [by the judiciary], strenuously
so, because they are critical to the functioning of an open and effective demo-
cratic process."' 79 "[I]mpediments to free speech, publication and political
association" 8 0 impair operation of the democratic process,' 8 ' and, according
to Ely, "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about." 2 The judiciary, rather than an elec-
torally accountable institution of government, should make the ultimate, criti-
cal choices in defining rights of speech and press, says Ely, because "we
cannot trust elected officials to do so: ins have a way of wanting to make sure
the outs stay out." 83 Policymaking that determines the character of rights of
speech and press "cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who




176. Id. at 181. See also Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 493.
177. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13 (1970):
In considering the role of the judiciary in a system of freedom of expression it is essential to
narrow the issues and establish a fundamental distinction. We are not dealing here with any general
function of our judicial institutions to foster the whole range of freedoms in a democratic society. Nor
are we dealing with any broad power to supervise or review all major actions of the legislative and
executive branches. We are concerned with the specific function of the judiciary in supporting a system
of freedom of expression. This involves the application of general principles of law to assure that the
basic mechanisms of the democratic process will be respected. It does not involve supervision over the
decisions reached or measures adopted as a consequence of employing democratic procedures. Re-
sponsibility for this is primarily that of the legislature. In other words, the judicial institutions are here
dealing essentially with the methods of conducting the democratic process, not with the substantive
results of that process. In this differentiation of function lies a generic distinction between the role of
the judiciary and the role of the legislature.
178. Or except to the extent authorized by Ely's limited noninterpretivist theory.
179. ELY, supra note 7, at 105.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 493,495: "Ilt is by
virtue of speech and assembly that the winds of doctrine blow and the freshets of change can course."
182. ELY, supra note 7, at 117.
183. Id. at 106.
184. ld. at 117. Ely makes essentially the same argument in support of noninterpretive review with respect
to issues concerning access to the franchise and the ballot. See id. at 116-125.
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Ely's argument should not be confused with Robert Bork's argument,
discussed earlier.' 85 Bork's effort was to persuade us that judicial enforcement
of a certain norm-freedom of political speech-not specifically constitu-
tionalized by the Framers, in particular enforcement of that norm against the
states, can be explained in terms of interpretive review-that such enforce-
ment does not involve judicial policymaking, but only judicial application of a
value judgment implicit in yet another value judgment, concerning the nature
of American government, specifically constitutionalized by the Framers. Ely,
by contrast, acknowledges that judicial enforcement of free-speech and free-
press norms not onstitutionalized by the Framers can be explained only in
terms of constitutional policymaking-that such enforcement involves much
more than application of value judgments attributable, even indirectly, to the
Framers. 86 Bork rejects all noninterpretive review; Ely seeks to justify non-
interpretive review of a certain sort-that in first amendment cases.
While Bork attempts to root judicial enforcement of his freedom-of-
political-speech norm in a value judgment attributable (in Bork's view) to the
Framers, Ely's effort---or so it seems to me'87-is to root judicial policymak-
ing with respect to first amendment norms"8 in a consensus-specifically, a
consensus in America as to something called "the democratic process." Ely's
argument seems to be that, given this consensus, some institution of govern-
ment should be charged with primary responsibility for maintaining the proc-
ess, and that the judiciary is the institution best adapted to such an enter-
prise. 1
89
A principal reason Ely rejects substantive due process is that there is no
consensus-certainly no ascertainable consensus-as to the various values
the judiciary enforces in substantive due process cases. But-and this is a
critical problem with Ely's argument in defense of noninterpretive review in
the first amendment cases-neither is there any consensus as to the sort of
democratic process that ought to prevail in America.'9° The sort of democratic
process that prevails at any given point is a function mainly of two factors:
first, the number of groups to whom the franchise is extended; second, the
185. See text accompanying notes 120-28 supra.
186. See note 189 infra.
187. See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1424 (1979); Tushnet, Darkness on the
Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047 (1980).
See also Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,235 (1981) ("perhaps
[Ely's] book is an exercise in contemporary consensus theory after all").
188. See ELY, supra note 7, at 105. "Virtually everyone agrees that the courts should be heavily involved
in reviewing impediments to free speech, publication, and political association."
189. Ely's discussion is not always clear. Perhaps Ely means to proffer an argument very much like Bork's.
Perhaps he means to say that the value--"the democratic process"-was implicitly constitutionalized by the
Framers to the extent that "the nature of the United States Constitution," see id. at 88-101, established by the
Framers presupposes and even ordains ",the democratic process." If that is indeed Ely's argument, then it is
infirm for the same reasons that Bork's is infirm. See text accompanying notes 120-28 supra.
190. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047 (1980).
Ely thinks that the society agrees that participation is the primary value; he criticizes natural law on the
basis that society does not agree about anything to a degree substantial enough to enable one to rely
upon social agreement as the basis for a theory. The empirical claim implicit in Ely's critique contra-
dicts the one implicit in his theory, and the first empirical claim is more plausible.
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nature of rights regarding speech, publication, and political association that
individuals have against government. 9' If there were a consensus as to the
nature of speech, publication, and associational rights individuals ought to
have, there would be, at least to that extent, a consensus as to the sort of
democratic process that ought to prevail. But of course there is no consensus
as to the nature of such rights and so, to that extent, no consensus as to "the
democratic process." 92 Indeed, if there were anything approaching a con-
sensus as to what speech, publication, and associational rights individuals
ought to have, the judiciary would likely have a severely diminished role in
defining, and in striking down governmental action in the name of, such
rights, because the consensus, if authentic, would presumably be reflected in
most if not all legislative and executive action. What Ely overlooks is that the
very same social and political fragmentation that prevents any consensus as to
the various values the judiciary enforces in substantive due process cases also
prevents consensus as to process. Mark Tushnet's comments to that effect
are applicable here:
The realist synthesis ... failed to answer the Holmesian challenge; it simply
shifted the locus of the difficulty. Holmes had said that law could not be seen as
the product or embodiment of neutral principles of justice because the fragmenta-
tion of society precluded agreement. The realist synthesis responded by pro-
pounding that process was all [that mattered]. But the absence of the social condi-
tions for agreement on substance was simultaneously an absence of the conditions
for agreement on process. 93
To forestall possible confusion, I want to emphasize what I am and am
not claiming. My point is that in America-even in America-there is no
authentic consensus as to the nature of the speech, publication, and associa-
tional rights individuals ought to have against government, and therefore, in
that respect, no consensus as to process. But this is not to claim that there is
no consensus as to process in any respect. Certainly there is a consensus, in
part reflected in the Constitution, that the franchise ought to exist, even if
there is some residual disagreement as to how broadly it ought to be ex-
tended.194 There is also a consensus-at least I am willing to concede to
191. C. R. DAHL, A PREFACETO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 59 (1956) "'[T]he 'key prerequisites to political
equality and popular sovereignty' are the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
the press."
192. See, e.g.. Hazard. The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. I, 26-27 (1978):
[Most] of the people most of the time do not have a binding commitment to the open political process. I
would surmise that at any given time an open political process is preferred only by a transient minority.
All political parties, like all businesses, strive for monopoly; all interest groups try to drown out their
opponents and very likely would seek to stifle them if not legally restrained; all branches and agencies
of government seek ascendancy when confronted by opposition; and summary justice for deviants is
probably favored by a clear majority.
193. Tushnet. Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in tire
Seventies. 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307. 1315 (1979).
194. As Ely reminds us: "Excluding the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments-the latter repealed
the former-[five of our last ten constitutional amendments] have extended the franchise to persons who had
previously been denied it." ELY. supra note 7, at 7; see also id. at 98-99. Of course, to the extent aconsensus as
to a value is reflected in the Constitution, it is unnecessary to defend judicial enforcement of the value by
reference to the consensus.
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interpretivism the claim of a rough consensus-as to the principle of elector-
ally accountable policymaking. All I mean to say at this point is that the
particular consensus on which Ely seems to rely--consensus as to a certain
sort of democratic process, one constituted in part by a particular conception
of freedom of expression-is nonexistent. Ely's argument therefore fails.
But perhaps there is another way of understanding Ely's argument. Per-
haps the argument Ely deploys does not rely, even implicitly, on any such
consensus. Ely's argument would then be seriously incomplete. If there is no
such consensus, by what right does the judiciary impose its particular con-
ception of the ideally functioning democratic process on the political com-
munity-that is, by what right does the judiciary substitute its particular
conception for the conception of the people's electorally accountable repre-
sentatives? That is the essential question posed by interpretivism, and the
question has very considerable force in light of the fact that in most first
amendment cases of consequence, the proper resolution of the dispute is
debatable. I do not deny that even a minimalist conception of democracy en-
tails some notion of freedom of expression; at least I am not inclined to claim
otherwise.' 95 But that concession doesn't help Ely, because the representa-
tives of the people aren't out to banish the ideal of freedom of expression from
the land, after all; the disagreement is about what the ideal ought to mean,
what content it ought to have, how it ought to be "interpreted." As modem,
seminal first amendment cases illustrate, there is not just one reasonable
conception of how the ideal of freedom of expression ought to operate, of
precisely what content it ought to have. There are competing reasonable
conceptions (and so Ely must explain why the electorally unaccountable
judiciary's particular conception ought to prevail in a society committed to
electorally accountable policymaking). The philosopher Thomas Scanlon puts
the point well:
Most of us believe that freedom of expression is a right .... There is less
agreement as to exactly how this right is to be understood-what limits and re-
quirements on decision making authority are necessary and feasible as ways of
protecting central participant and audience interests and insuring the required
equity in the access to means of expression .... This disagreement is partly
empirical-a disagreement about what is likely to happen if certain powers are or
are not granted to governments. It is also in part a disagreement at the founda-
tional level over the nature and importance of audience and participant interests
and, especially, over what constitutes a sufficiently equal distribution of the means
to their satisfaction. '9
195. See Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, TiE NEW YORK REVIEW, December 4,
1980, at 49, 53:
[James Madison] said that "'a popular government, without popular information or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both.... [A] people who mean to be
their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives."
196. Scanlon, Freedon of Erpression and Categories of rpression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519,536 (1979).
See also Wellington, Ott Freedom of Erpression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1113-16 (1979).
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The only thing Ely says that could count as an answer to the "by what
right" question is his claim that the "ins"-the incumbents-cannot be
trusted to resolve first amendment issues impartially. They will, says Ely,
resolve such issues in a manner designed to protect their incumbency. There
are two problems with that claim. First, the resolution of many first amend-
ment issues one way or another can have no real effect on any incumbent's
chances for reelection.' 97 Thus, the fact that the political vision of a typical
incumbent is often distorted by considerations of incumbency,98 is simply
irrelevant to the resolution of many first amendment issues and certainly does
not count as a reason for "trusting" the judiciary rather than incumbents with
respect to such issues.
Second, even with respect to first amendment issues that do implicate an
incumbent's reelection chances, it is fanciful to suppose that incumbents
would often protect their incumbency by conspiring to deny to the electorate
access to that basic store of information and ideas essential to the evaluation
of the main features of public policy and performance. It is difficult to imagine
such a conspiracy in contemporary American political culture-and among
incumbents who have, after all, mutually antagonistic interests.199 At any rate,
the supposition that such a conspiracy is lurking in the dark underside of
American politics and would erupt, but for a vigilant judiciary, is simply too
thin a predicate for a constitutional theory that seeks to justify noninterpretive
review in first amendment cases.2°
The fact of the matter-and it is a crucial fact-is that generally incum-
bents will, and do, resolve issues concerning freedom of expression the way
their constituencies-and, in sum, electoral majorities-want them re-
solved.20' Now, concededly that is a strategy designed to protect incumbency.
But one searches in vain through Ely's argument for a single reason why the
people shouldn't be able to choose, through their representatives,02 their own
197. Examples of such issues include the protection to be afforded speech advocating conduct unlawful
under a valid statute, see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the protection to be afforded
pornography, see, e.g.. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), or "'vulgar" expression, see, e.g., Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and the protection to be afforded commercial speech, see, e.g., Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
198. See generally D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
199. Recall that in the Pentagon Papers Case-New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971)-the Court did not order the Papers released, but merely refused to enjoin their publication.
200. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 143 (1956):
To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its Constitution seems to me an
obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has
remained because our society is essentially democratic. If the conditions necessary to polyarchy had
not existed, no constitution intended to limit the powers of leaders would have survived. Perhaps a
variety of constitutional forms could easily have been adapted to the changing social balance of power.
It is worth emphasizing.., that the constitutional system did not work when it finally encountered, in
slavery, an issue that temporarily undermined some of the main prerequisites for polyarchy.
201. Orat legst they generally do not resolve them in away their constituencies do not want them resolved.
202. Certainly the electorally accountable representatives of the people are more likely than the electorally
unaccountable federal judiciary to reflect the preferences of the people. See ELY, supra note 7, at 68: -[T]he
theory that the legislature does not truly speak for the people's values, but the [Supreme] Court does, is
ludicrous."
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conception of the ideally functioning democratic process-in particular their
own reasonable conception, among competing reasonable conceptions, of
freedom of expression-however opposed to the judiciary's conception-or
to Ely's, or to mine-that conception might be.203
The difficulty with the argument that courts should undertake to repair the
defects of the democratic processes is that the demonstration of a defect usually
consists in pointing to a law that the scholar in question would have vetoed had he
been the governor. The process is not really shown to be defective; the result is
simply disliked.204
One might try to argue that if the people, through their electorally ac-
countable representatives, are permitted to choose their own conception of
the democratic process-or, more narrowly, of freedom of expression-they
(in spite of what I said a moment ago) might end up emasculating the process,
and they simply can't be permitted to do that.20 5 The first problem with that
argument is that in most first amendment cases, the stricken governmental
action cannot plausibly be described as even a step towards emasculation of
the democratic process. A more fundamental problem is that the argument-
even if the deep skepticism on which it is predicated is not altogether un-
founded-proves too much. The people have a legal right to choose their own
203. CJ: Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendnent?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW, December 4,
1980, at 54:
The argument from the structure of democracy requires, by its own internal logic, some threshold
line to be drawn between interpretations of the First Amendment that would protect and those that
would invade democracy.
There is one evident, if difficult, way to draw that threshold line. It requires the Supreme Court to
describe, in at least general terms, what manner of invasion of the powers of the press would so
constrict the flow of information to the public as to leave the public unable intelligently to decide
whether to overturn that limitation of the press by further legislation. The Court might decide, for
example, that a general and arbitrary refusal of some agency of government to provide any information
or opportunity for investigation to the press at all, so as to leave the public wholly uninformed whether
the practices of that agency required further investigation, fell on the wrong side of that threshold. But
it is extremely implausible to suppose that the public would be disabled in this dramatic way if the press
were excluded from those few criminal trials in which the defendant requested such exclusion, the
prosecution agreed to it, and the judge thought the interests ofjustice would on balance be served by it.
The public of a state that adopted that practice would remain competent to decide whether it disap-
proved that arrangement and, if so, to outlaw it through the political process. So if Madison's argument
from the structure of democracy is applied to particular cases through the idea of a threshold of public
competence, [Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 896 (1980)] should have been decided
the other way.
204. Bork, The Consequences of Judicial Inperialism, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICA
(forthcoming 1981, American Enterprise Institute). See also White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme
Court: The Contemporar Debate antd the "Lessons" oJ History. 63 JUDICATURE 162, 165 (1979):
Here one confronts the central dilemma for the intraprofessionalist argument. If one assumes that
the Court should be constrained in the exercise of its lawmaking power and that the constraints should
be "professionally" derived, and one seeks the derivation of those constraints in the text, history, and
original purposes of the Constitution, how can onejustify constraints that follow from a contemporary
political interpretation of those purposes? In other words, what if an equally plausible or more plausi-
ble contemporary interpretation of the purposes of the Constitution can be put forth that would not
justify judicial review of legislative malapportionment? Such an interpretation is, of course, relatively
easy to advance. If the framers were so fundamentally dedicated to the principle of representativeness,
why did they permit so many classes of persons to be denied the right to vote?
205. See Auerbach, The Comnunist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free
Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956).
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conception by adopting a constitutional amendment embodying it. They even
have a legal right to abolish the first amendment by adopting a superseding
amendment to that effect. Why, then, can't the electorally accountable repre-
sentatives of the people choose their own conception in the ordinary course of
governmental policymaking-so long as they do not contravene any value
judgment constitutionalized by the Framers?
I hope I am not misunderstood. It's not that I think there is no answer to
the interpretivist's "by what right" question. Rather, my point is simply that
nothing Ely says amounts to an adequate answer, perhaps because he does
not face the question. Instead he seems to rely on a (nonexistent) consensus
that permits him to avoid the question; that is, he seems to take for granted
that the particular conception of the democratic process the judiciary imposes
on the political community-in the form of a particular conception of freedom
of expression, which conception is a principal constituent of the judiciary's
vision of the democratic process-is shared by that community. Thus, Ely
writes that noninterpretive review in first amendment cases "is not incon-
sistent with, but on the contrary is entirely supportive of the American system
of representative democracy."'06 Such a statement implies that there is no real
dispute as to what the precise character of "the American system of represen-
tative democracy" should be, in particular as to how the ideal of freedom of
expression should be developed. Ely also writes that "it is an appropriate
function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government run-
ning as it should." 207 That he does not pause to ponder the fact, or the
significance of the fact for his theory, that there is no consensus as to how that
machinery "should" run is likely because he does not acknowledge the fact;
indeed, he seems to posit a contrary fact-that there is a consensus.
If Ely were right, if there were a consensus, there would be no problem of
judicial "imposition"; the judiciary would simply be enforcing the people's
own conception of the democratic process. 2o But there is no such consensus.
And so-whether or not Ely does in fact rely or instead disclaims reliance on
any such supposed consensus-the interpretivist's "by what right" question
cannot be avoided:
The suggestion ... that because First Amendment freedoms are indispens-
able to effective participation in the political process they therefore deserve spe-
cial judicial protection, even beyond their clear constitutional scope, likewise begs
the question why the Court should exercise independent judgment to enlarge First
Amendment freedoms in accordance with the Court's determination of the desired
relationship between those freedoms and the political process. After all, to the
extent that First Amendment freedoms, or any other freedoms, are clearly pro-
tected constitutionally [i.e., to the extent they are constitutionalized by the
Framers], their judicial enforcement does not depend on the political process
206. ELY, supra note 7, at 102; see also id. at 88.
207. Id. at 76.
208. Of course, as I said a moment ago, if there really were a consensus, there would likely be little need for
the judiciary to enforce it.
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argument.... [To the extent that such freedoms are not clearly protected consti-
tutionally [not constitutionalized by the Framers], the justification for judicial
expansion, or contraction, of their scope depends on whether the Court is em-
powered to rewrite the Constitution in the service of judicially desired constitu-
tional change. 2°9
Either because it relies on a consensus that is nonexistent or because it
fails to deal adequately with the very question that, in the absence of that
consensus, must be addressed, Ely's argument does not justify noninterpre-
tive review in first amendment cases. The theory that does succeed (in my
view) in justifying noninterpretive review in first amendment cases also
serves to justify a sort of noninterpretive review-in substantive due process
cases-that many, including Ely, claim is illegitimate.
Let's now consider Ely's effort to justify constitutional policymaking by
the judiciary with respect to the norm of equal protection. Just as Ely thinks
there is a fundamental difference between noninterpretive review in substan-
tive due process cases, which Ely claims is illegitimate, and noninterpretive
review in first amendment cases, he also thinks there is a fundamental dif-
ference-indeed, largely the same difference-between noninterpretive re-
view in substantive due process cases and that in equal protection cases.
According to Ely, noninterpretive review in equal protection cases, like that
in first amendment cases, consists of judicial policymaking aimed at maintain-
ing the process of democratic government. While in first amendment cases the
judiciary maintains the democratic process, in Ely's view, by defining and
protecting speech, publication, and associational rights and thereby assuring
persons "the opportunity to participate ... in the political processes by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, ' 2'0 in equal
protection cases the judiciary maintains the democratic process by acting to
insure that persons belonging to certain minorities-in particular racial mi-
norities-are not denied "the opportunity to participate ... in the accom-
modation those processes have reached" 21'-not denied, that is, "access to
the . . . bounty of representative government," where "bounty" refers to
"exemptions or immunities from hurts (punishments, taxes, regulations, and
so forth) along with benefits .... [the] patterns of distribution generally." 212
Ely recognizes the anomaly-in Ely's view, only an apparent anomaly-
of claiming that the judiciary is merely acting to maintain the democratic
process when it compels the majority to grant to a minority some benefit the
majority has chosen to deny to that minority (or when it compels the majority
to refrain from imposing on a minority some burden the majority has chosen
to impose only on that minority). "[A] system of equal participation in the
processes of government is by no means self-evidently linked to a system of
209. S. GABIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT TEST 76-77 (1980).
210. ELY, supra note 7, at 77.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 74 & n.*.
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presumptively equal participation in the benefits and costs that process gen-
erates., 213 But Ely proposes
to suggest a way in which what are sometimes characterized as two conflicting
American ideals-the protection of popular government on the one hand, and the
protection of minorities from denials of equal concern and respect on the other-in
fact can be understood as arising from a common duty of representation.2 14
He proposes to show, that is, how the judicial enterprises of, first, "clearing
the channels of political change" and, second, "correcting certain kinds of
discrimination against minorities" are predicated on "a coherent theory of
representative government" 2 5-how, in other words, "these two sorts of
participation [in the processes of government and in the benefits and costs
those processes generate] join together in a coherent political theory. 2 6
Ely's way around the conflict is what he calls "the ... concept of 'vir-
tual representation.' , 217 Governmental officials can get by without represent-
ing the interests of persons belonging to minorities that chronically have little
if any political power-minorities, that is, unable to form effective political
alliances with other groups and therefore unable to become part of those
shifting majorities that wield power in a pluralist democracy-because as a
practical matter those officials are not electorally accountable to such per-
sons. Ely's concept of virtual representation is designed to overcome this
perceived defect in political reality by requiring officials to grant benefits,
which are granted to other persons, to persons with little political power, and
to refrain from imposing burdens, which are not imposed on other persons, on
persons with little political power, unless there is a constitutionally sufficient
reason-i.e., a reason the judiciary is willing to credit as legitimate and ade-
quately weighty-for doing otherwise. 2 8 "[A]t least in some situations," says
Ely, "judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes
of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation of minority
interests, even minority interests that are not voteless., 2'9 I am not inter-
ested, for present purposes, in Ely's problematic efforts to articulate criteria
213. Id. at 77. See note 218 infra. The other principal way the judiciary assures persons equal participation
in the process of government-the way other than by defining and protecting first amendment rights, that is-is
by defining and protecting voting rights. See ELY,supra note 7, at 116-25. By "equal" participation in the
process of government, Ely does not mean equal political clout, of course, but equal legal rights--.e., the same
legal rights others have-to speak one's mind, cast a vote, and the like.
214. Id. at 86-87.
215. Id. at 74.
216. Id. at 77.
217. Id. at 82.
218. See id. at 82:
[The concept of virtual representation] cannot mean that groups that constitute minorities of the
population can never be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a refusal to represent
them, the denial to minorities of what Professor Dworkin has called "equal concern and respect in the
design and administration of the political institutions that govern them."
Quoting R. DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). Ely underscores the fact that constitutionally
sufficient reasons can justify denials of equal participation in particular payoffs by terming the right to equal
participation "presumptive." ELY, supra note 7, at 77.
219.1d. at 86.
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for determining which minorities today chronically lack sufficient political
power to justify, under his theory, judicial protection of their interests against
the insensitivity or animus of electorally accountable policymakers. "-,0 I am
interested in whether the concept of virtual representation that Ely posits
succeeds in justifying noninterpretive review in equal protection cases.
The concept of virtual representation-or, looked at from the other side,
the presumptive right to equal participation in the payoffs generated by the
democratic process-may make good sense on political-moral grounds. But
clearly it is not a concept that the Framers constitutionalized. 2  Nor, of
course, is there any societal consensus as to the concept. 2 By what right,
then, does the judiciary constitutionalize the concept? That, again, is the
interpretivist's essential question and challenge. Ely seems at points to claim
that the concept is simply an aspect of the larger concept of "representation"
implicit in the notion of "the democratic process." For example, Ely writes
that judicial enforcement of virtual representation-what he calls "a repre-
sentation-reinforcing approach to judicial review"-"is not inconsistent with,
but on the contrary ... entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the
American system of representative democracy."-223 He also suggests that the
concept has "been at the core of our Constitution from the beginning," that it
"has informed our constitutional thinking from the beginning,- 224 that it "lies
at the core of our system [of government].'2
If in fact that, or something like it, is Ely's claim, it fails on two grounds.
First, even if the concept of virtual representation is somehow implicit in
Ely's particular vision of the democratic process, that alone would hardly
justify judicial enforcement of the concept in constitutional cases, for Ely's
particular vision of the democratic process is not one the Framers constitu-
26tionalized, or one as to which there is any consensus. - Second, and more
fundamentally, far from being implicit in the notion-or at least in any con-
ventional notion-of the democratic process, the concept of virtual repre-
sentation is plainly in tension with it. In rejecting Ely's various efforts to
justify "representation-reinforcement as a value that courts are entitled to
220. Compare id. at 145-70 with Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxon-
omy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3(1981); Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1931).
221. I do not take issue with Ely's interesting suggestion that something like the concept of virtual repre-
sentation is implicit in certain constitutional provisions, such as the privileges or immunities clause of article IV or
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, c. 3, which were designed, at least in part, to curtail parochial state
legislation discriminating against "geographical outsiders." See ELY, supra note 7, at 82-84. But it is clear
that the particular concept of virtual representation Ely espouses, designed to prevent unjustified discrimination
by a state against certain of its voting "insiders," is not one the Framers constitutionalized. And Ely does not
claim otherwise. If the Framers had constitutionalized the concept, judicial enforcement of it would constitute
interpretive review; Ely recognizes that judicial enforcement of the concept is a species of constitutional
policymaking, and he seeks to justify it as such.
222. See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
223. ELY, supra note 7, at 88.
224. Id. at 82.
225. Id. at 135.
226. See text accompanying notes 190-93 supra.
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press beyond that representation provided by the written Constitution and
statutes, " 7 Robert Bork, our exemplary interpretivist, has written:
It would not do to derive the legitimacy of representation-reinforcement from
such materials as, for example, the one-man-one-vote cases because those cases
themselves require justification and cannot be taken to support the principle ad-
vanced to support them. Nor would it do to rest the concept of representation-
reinforcement on the American history of steadily expanding suffrage. That ex-
pansion was accomplished politically, and the existence of a political trend cannot
of itself give the Court a warrant to carry the trend beyond its own limits. How far
the people decide not to go is as important as how far they do go.
The idea of representation-reinforcement, therefore, is internally contradic-
tory. As a concept it tends to devour itself. It calls upon the judiciary to deny
representation to those who have voted in a particular way to enhance the repre-
sentation of others. Thus, what is reinforced is less democratic representation than
judicial power and the trend toward redistribution of goods. 228
Of course, it is possible to define "the democratic process" prescrip-
tively-which is precisely what Ely has done-so as to encompass the con-
cept of virtual representation. But to do that is to try to win the argument by
an act of definition-a vain strategy when the definition is one as to which
there is nothing approaching a consensus.2 29 A less loaded definition of the
democratic process--one that tends to be more descriptive than prescrip-
tive-will include as one of its key elements the feature that policymaking,
which may or may not be constrained by a constitution, 23 is subject to control
by officials accountable, directly or indirectly, to the electorate. (Granted,
this element calls into question whether the American political system is
wholly democratic, given the prevalence of constitutional policymaking by
the judiciary.) Consequently, the concept of virtual representation, because it
was not constitutionalized by the Framers,23' is in tension with the notion of
the democratic process. Under the concept, as Ely elaborates it, the Supreme
Court has authority to require governmental officials to grant benefits to
persons to whom they do not want to grant them, and to refrain from imposing
burdens on persons on whom they want to impose them, unless the officials
can persuade the Court to let them do otherwise. In short, policymaking is
partly in the hands of an institution of government that by design is not
electorally accountable. The tension has been highlighted by Robert Cover in
his discussion of judicial protection of minorities in the period from 1938 to
1965 . 2 "[D]evelopments after 1938," says Cover, "were surely informed by
the tension between respect for the structures of [American] politics and
227. Bork, The Inpossibility oJ Finding Welfizre Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 698.
228. Id. at 698-99.
229. See note 2 supra.
230. Constrained that is. by a set of value judgments deemed for whatever reasons to have the status of
"supreme law.'"
231. See note 221 supra.
232. Cover, The Origins oJ Judicial ActiLism in the Protection of Minorities, in THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY IN AMERICA (forthcoming 1981, American Enterprise Institute).
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protection for minorities. ,233 The duty of virtual representation is a strategem
for protecting minorities from the vagaries of a "majoritarian" political proc-
ess, but protecting racial minorities (Cover's particular focus) "can hardly be
understood purely as a neutral regulation of the political processes when the
processes are mainly about the maintenance of Apartheid.",
234
Again, I am not saying that the concept of virtual representation is a bad
thing, or that the judiciary ought never to engage in constitutional policy-
making. The whole point of the work of which this Article is a part is to justify
some constitutional policymaking by the judiciary (noninterpretive review),
including that in equal protection cases. I mean only to say that the concept of
virtual representation is in tension with the notion of democratic process-in
particular with the principle of electorally accountable policymaking-and
thus the interpretivist's question cannot be ignored: By what right does the
judiciary impose the concept of virtual representation-the presumptive right
to equal participation in the payoffs generated by the democratic political
process-on electorally accountable officials? Here, as in his discussion of
noninterpretive review in first amendment cases, Ely points to the fact that
"[a]ppointed judges ... are comparative outsiders in our governmental
system, and need worry about continuance in office only very obliquely."
This, says Ely, puts them in a better position than electorally account-
able officials, in particular legislators, "objectively to assess claims
.. . that ... by acting as accessories to simple majority tyranny, our
elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those
whom the system presupposes they are."-235 I wonder what marvelous
"system" it is that "presupposes" that elected officials attend to the interests
of all persons, and not merely to the interests of the persons whose support
they need to continue in office. If there were an actual consensus-as op-
posed to a rhetorical tradition26 -supporting the proposition that the Ameri-
can political system ought to be such a system, judicial enforcement of the
concept of virtual representation could be defended as enforcement of that
consensus. But Ely does not claim, much less offer evidence to the effect that,
there is any such consensus, and in fact there is none.237
The fundamental problem with Ely's contention that elected representa-
tives cannot be trusted to resolve impartially equal protection claims-claims
that a benefit or a burden ought to be extended more widely or not at all-is
that generally they will, and do, resolve such claims the way their constituen-
cies want them resolved. And except for pointing to the possibility of "ma-
jority tyranny," Ely says nothing in response to the interpretivist's contention
that those constituencies should be able, and under "democratic" principles
are entitled, to resolve such claims the way they want-Ely concedes that the
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. ELY, supra note 7 at 103. See id. at 88, 102-03.
236. Which, like most such traditions, retlects not a-consensus but the rhetoric of political "elites.-
237. Again, if there were such a consensus, there would likely be little need for the judiciary to enforce it.
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proper resolution of such claims will "be full of judgment
calls"23--constrained only by value judgments constitutionalized by the
Framers. Constrained, that is, by interpretive review-judicial enforcement
of the Framers' value judgments-not by ioninterpretive review, which, as
Ely acknowledges, is what judicial enforcement of virtual representation
amounts to. Let Robert Bork make the point.
Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left to individual
freedom. Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where
its power is legitimate. Yet, quite obviously, neither the majority nor the minority
can be trusted to define the freedom of the other. This dilemma is resolved in
constitutional theory, and in popular understanding, by the Supreme Court's
power to define both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation of
the Constitution. Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined
areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, placed beyond the
reach of majorities by, the Constitution.239
"But," continues Bork, "this resolution of the dilemma imposes severe re-
quirements upon the Court. For it follows that the Court's power is legitimate
only if it" enforces the Framers' value judgments as to the proper "spheres of
majority and minority freedom. If [the Court]... merely imposes its own
value choices, . .. [i]t then necessarily abets the tyranny either of the ma-
jority or of the minority. ' 240
But what about the ugly possibility-indeed, if the past really is prologue,
the probability-to which Ely points: that, occasionally at least, majorities
will victimize chronically powerless minorities? There is, after all, much that
majorities can do to minorities that is not offensive to any value judgment that
the Framers constitutionalized. The Constitution established by the Framers
does not ordain a perfectly just political order. (Recall, for example, that the
1789 Constitution accommodated slavery. And the institution of racial segre-
gation, as we've seen, is not offensive to any value judgment that the Framers
of the fourteenth amendment constitutionalized.) Ely's basic argument-the
only thing he has to say that can serve as a response to the "by what right"
question-is that it is somehow fairer to have politically disinterested judges
resolve equal protection claims of majority tyranny than to have legislators-
in effect the majority itself-resolve them. Thus, the subtitle of the chapter in
which Ely elaborates the concept of virtual representation is "The Court as
Referee.", 24' He writes: "[A] referee analogy is... not far off: the referee is
to intervene ... when one team is gaining unfair advantage.,
242
But this elementary notion of "fairness," of impartial, disinterested con-
flict resolution, is not adequate to the justificatory task Ely and others assign
it. Consider Terrance Sandalow's argument to that effect:
238. Id. at 103.
239. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I. 3 (1971).
240. Id.
241. ELY, supra note 7. at 73.
242. Id. at 103.
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Prevailing ideas of fairness ... do not call for impartial decisions when rules are
to be legislated .... No one supposes, for example, that fairness requires courts
to substitute their judgments for those of legislatures with respect to tax rates for
the wealthy, the level of welfare payments for the poor, or the content of regula-
tions imposed upon milk producers in the interest of consumers. Such issues, it is
commonly understood, are to be resolved through the political process, and that is
so even though there is a risk that the majority will not fully appreciate the costs
that are imposed upon the minority....
As a nation, we are committed to the idea that government, to be ethically
defensible, requires the consent of the governed.... Since pre-Revolutionary
times, the active and continuous participation of the governed in their govern-
ment, either directly or by representation, government "of" and "by" the people,
has been understood to be central to the democratic ideal. Courts not only are
unable to draw upon this source of legitimacy, but in setting their judgment against
that of the legislature, they oppose the very agency of government that is most
clearly entitled to do so. 243
Ely does not adequately grapple with the sort of argument Professors Bork
and Sandalow develop, and therefore Ely's effort to justify noninterpretive
review in equal protection cases is seriously incomplete and, on that score
alone, unsuccessful. 244
Ely's effort to justify the species of noninterpretive review he finds con-
genial, "participational" review-his effort to establish that constitutional
policymaking in both freedom of expression and equal protection cases is not
inconsistent with our societal commitment to democratic government-is not
persuasive. And it is not persuasive mainly because it relies on a sleight of
hand: Ely conceptualizes "the democratic process," with which (he argues)
participational review is consistent, in a self-serving way. Seeming to rely on
some (imagined) consensus, he builds into his conception of the democratic
process those features that will permit him to conclude that participational
review "is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is entirely supportive of,
the American system of representative democracy. 245 In that crucial respect,
Ely's constitutional theory-his limited noninterpretivist theory-is quite
circular. More generally-and here I quote Larry Alexander's artful para-
phrase of my critique of Ely-"Ely fails to justify the imposition of his im-
plied-from-the-Constitution conception of democracy against the will of the
243. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1177-78 (1977).
244. His effort to justify noninterpretive review in procedural due process cases, in terms of"fairness," is
similarly unsuccessful. Compare ELY, supra note 7, at 21 ("what procedures are needed fairly to make what
decisions are the sorts of questions lawyers and judges are good at") with id. at 102 ("Lawyers are experts on
process writ small, the processes by which the facts are found and contending parties are allowed to present
their claims .... And of course many legislators are lawyers themselves."). Cf. CHOPER, supra note 3, at
72-73: "[T]he Court's constitutional reappraisal of those popularly sponsored policies that arguably endanger
one cluster of plainly articulated personal liberties, those that involve the administration ofjustice .... may be
independently justified as being of intrinsic and intimate concern to the functioning of the judicial department
itself."
245. ELY, supra note 7, at 102. Cf. note 2 supra.
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branches that are constituted according to an expressed-in-the-Constitution
conception of democracy.... I cannot see how to avoid concluding that
Ely has failed to defend, against the claims of interpretivism, what he set out
to defend.247
246. Alexander. Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taronom. and Critique. 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 3. 44 (1981).
247. Elsewhere in the work of which this Article is a part. I expect to show that Ely, moreover, has failed to
justify a distinction critical to his entire enterprise-the distinction between "participational" review on the one
hand, and "substantive" review on the other. The distinction, though seductive, is illusory. Or perhaps I should
say (if it makes a difference) that the distinction is not consequential. For the constitutional theory that
justifies-if indeed any constitutional theory finally justifies-noninterpretive review under "participational"
norms like freedom of expression and equal protection, also serves to justify noninterpretive review under the
"nonparticipational" political-moral norms that inform, for example, modem constitutional doctrine regarding
substantive due process. A corollary, of the you-can't-have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too variety, is that one cannot
do what Ely has tried to do-praise the judiciary's constitutional policymaking with respect to participational
norms while at the same time condemning it with respect to all other, nonparticipational norms. But that's
another story.

